ST 3-90.15

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites

Version 1.0

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Futures Development and Integration Center
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FOREWORD

ST 3-90.15 is designed to be a handbook for commanders and staffs conducting operations involving sensitive sites. Its primary audience is company- and battalion-level commanders and staffs. Its secondary audience is planners on higher-level staffs. Operations involving sensisitive sites require soldiers—primarily but not only of the combat arms—to use skills normally developed by soldiers of other specialties. For that reason, ST 3-90.15 brings together doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been published in several Army publications and contains references to publications where users may obtain more detail. It also includes lessons from recent operations in the Balkans and Central Asia.

ST 3-90.15 will be updated and republished one or two more times before being converted into a field manual. The quality and usefulness of the final product is heavily dependent on comments and suggestions from you, the user. If you have any suggestions on how to make this a better, more usable book—or if you have any lessons that you think your fellow soldiers need to know about before they execute a mission involving a sensitive site—I highly encourage you to send that information to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352. Send information electronically to CADD-JoinMultiDoc@leavenworth.army.mil

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Preface

PURPOSE

ST 3-90.15 provides tactical level guidance and considerations for Army forces conducting operations in a combat zone known or suspected to contain highly sensitive enemy facilities. This text provides a succinct discussion of current doctrine and evolving concepts and lessons to assist in these operations.

ST 3-90.15 defines sensitive sites and develops the tactical context in which Army forces may be required to deal with them. The capture and subsequent exploitation of sensitive sites may be crucial to the outcome of a campaign. Operations involving sensitive sites may be deliberate, against a known target, or may be initiated as a result of actions that subsequently reveal a previously unknown site. In either case, Army forces will be critical to the seizure, securing, and subsequent exploitation of the site.

SCOPE

ST 3-90.15 discusses actions Army forces take at sensitive sites incident to combat operations. ST-3-90.15 does not discuss operations conducted by Army forces as part of stability operations not in a combat zone or those related to peacetime military engagement. Examples of these operations include security assistance and domestic support operations, such as chemical, biological radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management, and support to sensitive site operations conducted by forces of a host nation. This manual focuses on actions taken against sensitive sites operated by an enemy in a combat zone. While such operations are normally incident to offensive and defensive operations, Army forces can expect to conduct them in combat zones as part of a stability operation or, in rare cases, a support operation. This manual does not apply to operations conducted primarily by special operations forces (SOF).

The intended audience for this manual is division- through battalion-level staffs, as well as company-level commanders of units that are the primary means of seizing, securing, and supporting sensitive sites. The manual addresses aspects of operations involving sensitive sites from the perspective of deliberate actions and hasty actions. (See FM 3-90.)

This manual complements Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) *Field Commander's Handbook: Tactical Checklist for the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Facilities in a Combat Environment*, (now being drafted) and is intended to be used with it. The principal tactical references for operations at sensitive sites are FM 3-90, *Tactics*, and FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.* Together, these manuals provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that cover tactical actions by Army forces at and inside known or suspected sensitive sites.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The proponent for this text is Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The glossary lists most terms used in ST 3-90.15 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which ST 3-90.15 will become the proponent manual (the authority) upon its approval as a field manual are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. Definitions for which ST 3-90.15 will become the proponent manual upon its approval as a field manual are printed in boldface in the text. Upon approval of ST 3-90.15 as a field manual, these terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision of FM 101-501. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition.

The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined in JP 1-02 and FM 101-5-1. It does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations and acronyms—for example, the abbreviations for military ranks and publications—are not spelled out; refer to the glossary. Since *ARFOR* is a defined term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This is the proponent manual for three terms: sensitive site, sensitive site exploitation, and sensitive site exploitation team. Understanding the definitions of these terms is central to understanding operations involving sensitive sites. These definitions focus the tactical discussion by excluding a wide range of areas that may complicate tactical operations—such as toxic waste dumps or fortified enemy positions—that are not normally considered sensitive sites. In general, sensitive sites are areas of strategic concern. As such, they are designated by description and location (when known) by the joint force commander (JFC).

SENSITIVE SITE

A *sensitive site* is a geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military, or economic sensitivity to the United States. Examples of sensitive sites include war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government, document storage areas for enemy classified files, or research and production facilities involving breakthrough technologies. Any place that contains or is suspected to contain, enemy research, production, storage, employment, use, or threat of use, of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons is a sensitive site. These include areas, buildings, sites, or equipment that contain, or are suspected of containing, information, personnel, or equipment related to the proliferation of enemy CBRN capability. The JFC may identify and designate other sensitive sites involving diplomatic, informational, military, or economic areas.

The JFC receives guidance concerning potential sensitive sites from the Secretary of Defense, through the combatant commander. In some instances, the JFC may delegate classification authority to a component operational headquarters. In other instances, a multinational headquarters may classify certain types of sites as sensitive. In each case, higher headquarters planning guidance and intelligence concerning sensitive sites translates into intent, objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), and coordinating instructions for executing Army forces.

SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION

Sensitive site exploitation **consists of a related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site**. **These activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents**. While the physical process of exploiting the sensitive site begins at the site itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located around the world.

SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION TEAM

The *sensitive site exploitation team* is a tailored organization responsible for entering a captured sensitive site to exploit its contents and neutralize or remove any threats posed by material found inside. Normally organized around joint and interagency experts, these teams include specially trained, equipped, and qualified individuals and elements. Commanders tailor sensitive site exploitation teams to include the specialties needed to exploit the site. Inside the sensitive site, the sensitive site exploitation team is in charge of all activities. Army tactical units at the sensitive site support the site exploitation team. Ideally, commanders form a task force (TF) consisting of tactical elements and the sensitive site exploitation team to conduct operations at the sensitive site. In some cases, Army tactical units will provide the majority of the sensitive site exploitation team with only one or two supervising officials at the site. In rare instances, Army tactical units may provide the entire sensitive site exploitation team. In these cases, the team is normally has reachback access to subject matter experts.

The size and complexity of some sensitive sites may require multiple teams of specialists to properly exploit. In that event, the headquarters committing the teams, for example the joint force land component, designates a single sensitive site exploitation team coordinator for all teams exploiting the site. In rare instances where multiple exploitation teams arrive without a designated leader, the senior tactical commander coordinates site exploitation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Photograph, Boeing Company Workers Camouflage the Seattle Factory (p. 1-4) © Boeing Corporation. Used by permission.

Chapter 1

Operational Environment

Sensitive sites are an integral part of today's operational environment. The manner in which they are exploited can significantly affect conduct of the campaign. This chapter discusses the types of sensitive sites Army forces may encounter and the tactical imperatives that govern operations involving them.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-1. Warfare between the United States and its adversaries in the early 21st century will be increasingly asymmetric. FM 3-0 frames asymmetry:

> *Asymmetry concerns dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and U.S. forces.... Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm.... Asymmetry becomes very significant, perhaps decisive, when the degree of dissimilarity creates exploitable advantages. Asymmetric engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the target is not ready to defend itself against the asymmetric threat.*

1-2. Recent conflicts in the Balkans and the global war on terrorism provide glimpses of the increasingly asymmetric nature of enemy forces and the means by which they oppose U.S. forces. Adversaries have learned that conventional military operations against superior U.S. forces result in unacceptable losses, if not outright defeat. Consequently, enemies resort to adaptive tactics and strategies that minimize U.S. strengths while providing opportunities to inflict casualties on U.S. forces and prolong the conflict.

1-3. To an increasing degree, hostile nations and nonstate adversaries are developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both for their potential deterrence against the United States and to threaten their opponents. More ominously, enemies may regard the use of such weapons as politically or militarily expedient or, worst of all, for reasons that are largely incomprehensible within civilized norms. Deterrence strategies may prove ineffective against irrational actors. Therefore, completely eliminating an enemy's capability to acquire, store, and employ these weapons becomes a crucial component of the end state of any future campaign. Eliminating enemy WMD may be the principal objective of a campaign; the defeat or destruction of the enemy's other military capability would be a necessary step to achieve the larger goal.

1-4. Creating the conditions required to completely eliminate enemy WMD requires ground forces. In most cases, this means Army forces. Army forces are the principal means by which combatant commanders and JFCs control populations, territory, and resources. Land forces make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of fires. While adversaries may hide, disperse, and preserve their most important capabilities against precision strikes, they cannot preserve their capabilities when their territories are occupied, their means of population control dismantled, and while Army forces, backed by overwhelming joint firepower, relentlessly pursue any remaining threats.

1-5. Army forces may do more than eliminate WMD threats. As occurred in 1945, advancing Army forces may discover hideous secrets. The capture and subsequent documentation of areas an enemy has kept secret may have enormous diplomatic and informational power. As with the destruction of enemy WMD, the capture and exposure of enemy sites of political power may be essential to the success of a campaign and contribute directly to liberating an oppressed and terrorized population.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

1-6. Activities in the information environment, which is pervasive and largely outside the control of U.S. forces, affect operations involving sensitive sites. Commanders may expect sensitive sites to receive intense media attention, particularly early in a conflict. Accounts of sensitive sites will receive global dissemination. The presence of press representatives with access to global media will make it nearly impossible to conceal the location and nature of captured enemy sensitive sites. Units encountering sensitive sites should prepare to deal with the media. Higher headquarters must be prepared to support sensitive site operations with public affairs teams while acting as an information conduit for truthful information about the situation.

> **The *information environment* is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information; also included is the information itself.**
>
> JP 1-02

1-7. Enemies attempt to exploit the information environment in many ways. They may use false statements and images to deny facts and dissuade and confuse the global audience. In territory under their control, enemies may try to convince the populace that activities discovered by U.S. forces are actually U.S. propaganda. In recent conflicts, enemies have fabricated outrageous lies and spread them through unprincipled news sources. While commanders cannot control the information environment or global news services, they can ensure that (1) information provided to higher headquarters is brief and accurate and (2) information provided through public affairs channels about sensitive sites is appropriate, accurate, and timely.

1-8. Sometimes the local populace must be notified of the threat posed by a sensitive site in a friendly area of operations (AO). In some instances, enemies may try to incite panic by exaggerating the threat posed by weapons and facilities captured by U.S. and multinational forces. In other instances,

U.S. forces may discover that the actual threat posed by a captured site is serious and that the local inhabitants are in danger. In such situations, civil affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs support is indispensable.

1-9. The information aspects of sensitive site operations often become a dominant planning consideration. Units encountering a sensitive site contribute to information superiority at the site. Commanders should understand and be prepared to exploit all aspects of the sensitive site information environment and to use that information to friendly advantage. Commanders should understand who the key leaders, communicators, and decision makers are, the composition of the information infrastructure, and the decision making process at the sensitive site as well as in the immediate surrounding area. As a minimum, commanders and staffs consider the elements show in Figure 1-1.

Focus	Aspects
Key Leaders and Decision Makers	• Personality, behavior, and psychological profiles of key leaders, communicators, and decision makers • Interaction and perceptions among leaders/groups • Populace perception of leadership and how population behavior influences leaders • How information flows: vertical, horizontal, route, decision points • How information is assimilated • How information is used
Information Infrastructure	• What information systems and technology are used for C2, communications, site operations, site surveillance, and security? • What information operations capabilities and functions do they have? • What are the critical supporting systems—electricity, transportation, POL, water, economic, media, and site security?
Decision Making Process	• What are the information collection resources at the site, for example, SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT? • How are decisions made—centralized or decentralized?

Figure 1-1. Aspects of the Information Environment

ENCOUNTERING SENSITIVE SITES

1-10. The types of sensitive sites vary enormously. The most dangerous sites involve WMD. These pose major threats to both the noncombatant population and U.S. forces. In addition to their deadly contents, the sites' political and military importance guarantees that they will be protected by a combination of passive and active defenses. Other types of sites, while likely not as well

defended or hidden, will contain some combination of active and passive security. The thing that soldiers must understand is that the enemy designs sensitive sites with two priorities. First, sites are designed to keep important material, people, and information inside. Second, sites are designed to keep intruders and the civilian population outside. The degree of protection varies based on the enemy's threat assessment, but may be very elaborate. Often, carefully guarded entrances may be the only access to sensitive facilities deep underground. In some instances, sites may be elaborately camouflaged to conceal its existence from not only external enemies but from the general population. The photograph below (Figure 1-2) illustrates passive protection of a sensitive military site in the United States during World War II.

Figure 1-2. Boeing Company Workers Camouflage the Seattle Factory to Look like a Residential Neighborhood from the Air (1942) (© Boeing Corporation)

1-11. Army forces may encounter sensitive sites under two circumstances: deliberate and hasty. (FM 3-90 contrasts hasty and deliberate operations.) In a deliberate encounter, the existence of the site and its general nature, extent, and purpose are known. Operations to seize, secure, exploit, and neutralize or destroy it are deliberately planned, using forces task-organized for the mission. In the case of small sites defended by forces smaller than a

battalion, the operation is often a raid conducted by a battalion- or brigade-sized TF. Operations involving large sensitive sites defended by battalion-sized or larger enemy forces are conducted by brigade or division-sized forces. These may involve encircling, isolating, and destroying the defenders before seizing the complex. A deliberate mission to seize and secure a sensitive site is preferred. In an AO containing known sensitive sites, commanders organize TFs with the mission of seizing and securing sensitive sites, and subsequently supporting their exploitation. Planners balance the requirements of ongoing operations with requirements to seize and secure sensitive sites. They allocate forces according to the commander's priorities.

1-12. While deliberate operations are preferred, military history and the realities of modern operations indicate that some operations involving sensitive sites will be hasty. Intelligence is rarely perfect, and enemies take extraordinary measures to hide some sensitive sites. In hasty encounters, Army forces discover a sensitive site during operations to accomplish another mission. In some instances, intelligence, security, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations may detect a sensitive site for which no planning has taken place. In other situations, intelligence developed over time may identify an area previously overrun or bypassed as being much more important than assumed. In each case, the unit controlling the AO in which the site is discovered takes immediate steps to seize, secure, and possibly exploit the site. Even when forces lack intelligence about sensitive sites in their AO, battalion and higher-level units include branches addressing incidental encounters of sensitive sites in their tactical plans.

ENEMY FORCES AT SENSITIVE SITES

1-13. Although capturing and exploiting sensitive sites may be important to a campaign's success, defeating and destroying enemy forces will often be the only way to secure them. Due to their importance, enemy forces may defend sensitive sites tenaciously. In other cases, defenders may abandon the area before confronting U.S. forces. In still other cases, some enemy forces may attempt to surrender to Army forces, while others resist until they are destroyed. There are historical instances of some enemy forces deliberately attacking other enemy forces that were attempting to surrender.

1-14. Because enemies place strategic value on sensitive sites, the most proficient and dedicated enemy forces may defend them. Often sensitive sites are defended in layers, with external defense assigned to police, territorial, or militia forces, and internal security assigned to more reliable, better equipped, and better trained forces. As a result, Army forces engaged in operations at a sensitive site may first encounter limited or ineffective resistance. As Army forces approach the most sensitive areas of the site, which they may not know about, enemy resistance may increase sharply. Most challenging of all, Army units may be confronted simultaneously with some enemy units attempting to surrender, while others engage U.S. forces with all available means without regard to their countrymen.

1-15. Within or close to a sensitive site, attacking Army forces may encounter civilians that work or live at and around the site. Some may be important for what they know, for example, scientists. Others may be important because of

what they have done there—torture and murder, for example. Unfortunately, few of these people will be immediately distinguishable as key enemy civilians or innocent noncombatants. Army forces must be prepared to secure and safeguard uniformed and civilian prisoners discovered at sensitive sites, and hold them or transport them to where qualified interrogators can determine their status and intelligence value. Military police support should be used whenever available to assist with prisoner and detainee handling.

TACTICAL IMPERATIVES FOR OPERATIONS INVOLVING SENSITIVE SITES

1-16. Commanders consider the following imperatives when conducting operations involving sensitive sites:

- Isolate, seize, and secure sensitive sites as soon as tactically feasible, and control them until they are neutralized or destroyed.
- Plan for operations involving sensitive sites.
- Report the discovery of suspected sensitive sites immediately.
- Balance mission accomplishment with force protection.
- Use trained and equipped experts for site exploitation.
- Provide all feasible support to the site exploitation team.
- Secure and safeguard captured personnel, materiel, documents, and electronic data for exploitation.

ISOLATE, SEIZE, AND SECURE SENSITIVE SITES AS SOON AS TACTICALLY FEASIBLE AND CONTROL THEM UNTIL THEY ARE NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED

1-17. In cases involving the discovery of a sensitive site, U.S. forces isolate, seize, and secure the site as soon as it is tactically feasible. There are two overriding concerns when a sensitive site is discovered. First, secure the site and deny any further benefit to the enemy from its personnel or contents. Second, protect friendly forces and any noncombatants in the area.

1-18. Not all sensitive sites require assault. Historically, simply demanding their surrender has captured many sensitive sites. The enemy forces securing a site are usually very aware of their isolation, and this may create opportunities for avoiding bloodshed. In general, commanders should use the minimum necessary force to seize and secure an enemy site. However, no doctrinal publication can substitute for the judgment of the commander at the scene. Prudence and experience tell Army forces to be prepared for the worst, but to exploit opportunity when presented.

1-19. A particularly dangerous period occurs when the enemy abandons a sensitive site and friendly forces are not in position to secure it. Noncombatants may enter the site for any number of reasons. In doing so, they not only expose themselves to great risk, but also may endanger the nearby population as well as any friendly forces near the site.

1-20. Tactical planning and execution in AOs that might contain sensitive sites should include forces designated to deal with the site. Offensive operations present the greatest challenge. The discovery of a sensitive site compels the commander to allocate combat power to isolate, seize, and secure

it, even as other attacks continue. Various tactical combinations—such as, follow and support, follow and assume, or designation of adequate reserves—allow attacking forces to continue their mission without losing momentum. In ideal circumstances, a division or corps retains a specially organized unit to move immediately to any sensitive site and support site exploitation.

1-21. In terms of echelon, company-sized units will often support exploitation of a small sensitive site, such as, a group of warehouses, medium-sized cave, or walled compound. Such support normally includes external security, tactical reserves, and one or more support teams working inside the site. In instances involving larger complexes, such as a factory or production and test facility, a battalion-sized force may execute the mission, task-organizing companies to conduct a myriad of tasks. In the case of a very small site, such as a single building, a platoon-sized force may support the exploitation. In each instance, the commander considers the size of the site and the threat, the contents of the site, the duration of the exploitation, and the nature of support required by the site exploitation team. Army forces continue to secure sensitive sites until relieved by other security forces, or until the site exploitation team neutralizes or destroys the site.

PLAN FOR OPERATIONS INVOLVING SENSITIVE SITES

1-22. The direct corollary to the first principle is that units should have contingency plans or standing operating procedures (SOP) in place to provide subordinate elements with guidance in the event a sensitive site is discovered. Even when intelligence does not indicate that a sensitive site may be in the AO, battalion- and larger-sized maneuver forces should develop branches to their base orders that address sensitive sites, in case they are confronted with one. Branches involving sensitive sites should include force protection measures, reporting procedures, and any coordinating measures pertinent to the theater situation, such as pertinent rules of engagement (ROE). A careful intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) prepares commanders and units for possible sensitive site operations.

1-23. Special operations forces operating across the theater may locate sensitive sites but not have the capability to secure or exploit them. Because the SOF elements usually work for a different chain of command, liaison between SOF and tactical forces must be established and tested before the tactical requirement arises. Typically the liaison is established at corps level, but may extend to division in nonlinear situations. Similar considerations apply for multinational forces.

REPORT THE DISCOVERY OF SUSPECTED SENSITIVE SITES IMMEDIATELY

1-24. The discovery of a sensitive site is of immediate interest to the theater chain of command. The discovering unit should provide an immediate report with as much detail as feasible. The discovering commander balances the need for detail and speed against the risk involved in obtaining it. Excessive haste may lead to casualties from enemy action or by blundering into a hazardous area. Excessive caution may allow the enemy to improve defenses and reinforce, or succeed in removing key personnel and equipment unobserved.

1-25. In some instances, tactical units may uncover something that does not fit neatly into approved categories of sensitive sites. For example, a unit may capture a paper printing facility engaged is mass-producing counterfeit U.S. currency. The tactical rule is, "when in doubt, secure it and report it." Higher headquarters receiving reports of unusual sites or enemy activities react in a similar fashion. They report to the JFC on the nature of the event and request support needed to determine the importance of the site.

BALANCE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT WITH FORCE PROTECTION

1-26. Careful mission analysis allows commanders to assess the risk to the unit and mission, as well as to noncombatants. There are two aspects of risk management that must be factored into mission accomplishment.

1-27. The first includes steps to mitigate the risk to units conducting combat operations near CBRN sites. In addition to the normal hazards associated with combat, tactical leaders consider the effects of placing fires on the site. In some cases, overwhelming firepower cannot be employed, even though it would result in swift destruction of defending enemy forces. Tactical units cannot afford to make mistakes with enemy WMD. Therefore, commanders may be compelled to attack very methodically to seize and secure a sensitive site. While this may be readily apparent to the commander on the ground, it may be less understandable to higher commanders. Senior commanders should allow the tactical commander ample latitude to accomplish the mission and help deflect pressure from the higher-level chain of command.

1-28. The second area of increased risk occurs when the site is secure but not exploited. In addition to the threats posed by the contents of the site, the site may be booby-trapped, mined, or severely damaged, or be protected by command-detonated or command-activated explosive devices. Additionally, the site may be or contain unexploded ordnance (UXO) or other improvised explosive devices. In some cases, the enemy might try to destroy the site to prevent capture. Commanders establish tight controls at sensitive sites and depend on subject matter experts to establish the correct sequence of actions to exploit it.

1-29. Commanders avoid jeopardizing the command after the site is secure. They take every precaution and maintain discipline and security until the mission is complete. They minimize the exposure to hazards at the site. Once the site is secure, force protection becomes a primary consideration. Commanders keep in mind the natural curiosity of the American soldier and enforce restrictions against souvenir hunting and unauthorized exploration of what may be a very unusual location. Commanders stress that unauthorized activities jeopardize the safety of the troops and may inhibit the site exploitation.

USE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED EXPERTS FOR SITE EXPLOITATION

1-30. CBRN sites contain materiel that is extremely deadly. Many sites will contain UXO; some will be laced with booby traps. The enemy will attempt to prevent U.S. forces from exploiting his sites; the sites may be prepared for demolition or partially demolished. Even sites that do not pose a physical threat may contain materiel, documents, data, or evidence that, if

mishandled, could diminish their potential value. Sensitive site exploitation performed by interagency and joint teams, and supported by Army forces working under their close supervision, ensures maximum exploitation with minimum risk.

1-31. Commanders use tactical forces for site exploitation only as a last resort and, even then, reach back for advice by experts. Before commencing site exploitation with tactical elements, they coordinate with higher headquarters to make sure the urgency of entering the site justifies the additional risk. They always request assistance from available experts. If tactical circumstances require immediate exploitation of the site, commanders organize and prepare carefully, and proceed methodically.

PROVIDE ALL FEASIBLE SUPPORT TO THE SITE EXPLOITATION TEAM

1-32. Once a sensitive site is seized, the decisive operation becomes the exploitation of the site. Army tactical units provide external security and additional support as required to the site exploitation team. The site exploitation teams may consist of civilian experts, special operations forces, or other joint and interagency elements. Friction between Army forces and exploitation teams may be unavoidable, but can be minimized. The tactical chain of command should be briefed on the importance of the task and the importance of smooth support to the exploitation teams. All members of the unit should understand that the exploitation teams might generate a lot of support requirements. The tactical unit commander establishes a tasking channel from the exploitation teams through unit's command post. This eliminates confusion and preserves external security around the site.

SECURE AND SAFEGUARD CAPTURED PERSONNEL, MATERIEL, DOCUMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC DATA FOR EXPLOITATION

1-33. Seizing and securing a sensitive site eliminates its value to the enemy. The value of a sensitive site to friendly forces is a function of exploiting its contents. Once a sensitive site has been captured, the capturing unit preserves materiel within the site for exploitation. For CBRN sites, the primary challenge centers on containing the lethal material until the sensitive site exploitation teams can either remove or destroy it. Sensitive sites normally contain a wealth of intelligence, often stored electronically in computers and data networks. The capturing unit also secures and safeguards military and civilian personnel captured at the site. Properly interrogated, prisoners may produce intelligence with tactical, operational, and strategic value.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR SITES

1-34. CBRN sites can pose significant, special challenges for all but the most specialized units. The quantity, concentration levels, and possible unfamiliarity (in the instance of new or novel agents) of chemical agents may well exceed the capabilities and level of expertise found in tactical NBC defense units. Therefore, the role of tactical-level units in sensitive site exploitation centers on seizing (if necessary), securing, and preserving the integrity of the site pending arrival of subject matter experts trained and equipped to technically exploit it. Tactical unit commanders should anticipate

and prepare for a subject matter expert team support requirement. These requirements may include subject matter expert team reception and life support, local security, communications support, transportation support (for the team and possibly for retrograde of equipment or evidence), and emergency medical support.

1-35. CBRN sites will generally fall into one or more of the following categories:

- Chemical and biological research and development facilities.
- Chemical and biological production facilities.
- Nuclear research and development facilities.
- Nuclear production facilities.

1-36. *Chemical and biological (CB) research and development facilities* study new CB agents and equipment, and techniques for their employment. Some facilities that conduct CB defensive research activities (for example, development of antidotes and medical treatment procedures) typically possess some quantity of "live" chemical or biological agents. Units entering these sites must exercise great caution, as there may be new, novel, or especially dangerous agents, the release of which could have disastrous consequences. The best of these facilities typically incorporate multiple redundant containment areas, although levels of sophistication vary widely. The containment areas may include multiple airlocks leading to increasingly "sterile" rooms and be protected by atmospheric overpressure. Containment procedures for facilities of terrorists and other nonstate actors may be quite rudimentary. Although chemical and biological research and development is generally conducted at fixed-site locations, instances of mobile laboratories used for covert purposes are not unknown.

1-37. *Chemical and biological production facilities* engage in the large-scale manufacture of chemical or biological agents for use in weapons. The scope of work in these facilities may be limited to merely producing the agents, or may involve manufacture of the weapon system and filling the munitions with a CB agent (weaponization).

1-38. *Nuclear research and development facilities* study the production of weapons-grade radioactive materials; nuclear weapons and their effects, associated components, and equipment; or techniques for nuclear weapons employment. Although these are generally fixed-site locations, instances of mobile laboratories used for covert purposes are not unknown.

1-39. *Nuclear production facilities* engage in the large-scale manufacture of enriched radioactive materials, weapons components, or weaponization of fissile materials.

OTHER CBRN-RELATED SITES

1-40. *CBRN test sites* are usually operated in conjunction with research and development facilities. Test sites may be open-air or enclosed in a protected building. Open-air sites can present residual hazards for personnel in or near them. Many such sites are associated with storage facilities that may present additional hazards. Unfortunate subsets of this category are sites where chemical or biological weapons have been used against personnel (typically,

unprotected personnel and/or noncombatants) and which require documentation for war crimes proceedings.

1-41. Other sites and equipment associated with CBRN research, development, and production can provide valuable information regarding the direction and sophistication level of the enemy's WMD efforts. Information gained from these sites can produce intelligence in areas such as the focus of research activities, intended WMD use, and noncompliance with treaties or other international agreements. For example, missile engine testing facilities and missile engine test stands can yield information about the size of rocket motors/missile engines being tested. This information can be used to calculate weapons specifications, such as maximum weapons/agent payloads and missile range. Other items of interest might include computers and electronic storage media, paper files, blueprints and drawings, and key personnel who can provide further information and insights regarding the site's activities.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

1-42. Military individual protective equipment may not protect soldiers in some situations. It is designed to protect personnel from chemical warfare agents in a combat environment but provides limited protection in high-concentration environments and from hazards other than chemical and biological weapons. For additional detail on protective measures see FM 3-11.21.

1-43. Protection against commonly encountered chemical and biological agents is afforded by use of commonly issued NBC protective gear—either battle dress overgarments (BDO) or improved joint lightweight CB protective garments. However, these suits are designed to protect against typical field concentrations of chemical and biological agents; they may not provide the necessary level of protection required in a laboratory, production site, or storage site. The higher concentrations and quantities of agents encountered at these sites may also shorten duration of protection. Similarly, tactical NBC protective gear is not designed to protect against many industrial chemicals (such as chlorine). In addition, the NBC protective mask is designed to filter air, not supply it; masks will not protect soldiers in an oxygen-deficient environment. These situations require certified operators with specialized protective ensembles, such as rubberized overgarments and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). These specialists are not assigned to tactical units.

1-44. Issued NBC protective gear provides some protection from radiological hazards. This equipment protects soldiers against the inhalation of, ingestion of, or contact with radioactive contaminants (such as radioactive dust). However, the NBC protective gear does not protect against gamma and neutron emissions from highly radioactive contamination. Units should avoid entering known areas of radioactive contamination; however if entry into a radioactive hazard area is required, commanders follow the radiological operations procedures discussed in FM 3-3-1. Commanders aggressively monitor radiation dose rate levels and consider it when determining time of stay and other mission parameters. The unit's supporting NBC and medical staff advise the commander on operational aspects of radiological defense.

1-45. Regardless of the exact nature of the hazard, one of the most important considerations is limiting the spread of contamination from the site. Tactical unit commanders do this by establishing a control line, limiting site access, and by implementing control measures (radiation dose/dose rate monitoring and decontamination as appropriate) for the few personnel allowed to enter the site. In rare instances, additional measures may be required to correct active hazards: these might include activities such as shutting a valve releasing chemical agents into the air, or digging an expedient sump to contain or divert the flow of a liquid agent. (See TC 3-15.).



Figure 1-3. Example Contaminated Site Organization

1-46. If unit NBC survey teams are tasked to enter the site (for example, to perform a preliminary reconnaissance), commanders provide specific guidance regarding their activities. For example, unit teams should avoid entry into "hot" containment areas (usually characterized by redundant airlock systems or laboratory "glove box" apparatus). Regardless of whether the individual protective suits provide adequate protection, the danger of releasing CBRN agents from the containment area to the environment will probably far exceed any short-term intelligence gain. In such cases, the commander may determine it more prudent to seal and report the presence of the area and wait for a subject matter expert team with proper protective equipment and training.

1-47. Controlled access areas may be established after determining the boundaries of liquid or vapor contaminated areas. Standoff detection capability should be used where possible, but it may be necessary in many instances to send in a unit NBC survey and monitoring team. Again, it is important for commanders to be aware that commonly issued NBC detection and identification equipment is designed to detect a finite number of expected chemical agents at concentrations which are of immediate danger to troops. It might not detect very low-level agent concentrations, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial materials, or chemical warfare agents other than those for which it was designed. Unit-issued NBC detection equipment is not designed to detect biological agents. Tactical unit commanders who have a need to secure suspected chemical and biological sites may require augmentation from their supporting NBC reconnaissance platoons (division- and corps-level), or from the BIDS (biological identification and detection system) platoon located at corps- or theater-level. Tactical units required to secure suspected radiological or nuclear sites will often require augmentation from specialized radiological response teams, such as Army radiation control (RADCON) or theater asset medical lab (TAML).

1-48. Tactical-unit-level radiological survey teams, using organic equipment (such as AN/VDR-2 RADIAC sets) can determine gamma radiation boundaries. Once the boundaries of the CBRN contamination area have been determined, commanders establish control measures that limit access to the site. Procedures for establishing access control are contained in FM 3-11.21, DA Pam 50-5, and in DA Pam 50-6. In addition, environmental sampling should be conducted as necessary to identify the specific CBRN hazard. Mobile analysis laboratories within the theater or fixed laboratories outside of the theater may be required to conclusively identify CBRN hazards present in samples.

1-49. Separate control lines may be needed to limit access to contamination transfer areas and to vapor hazard areas, based on the situation. Access control points should incorporate decontamination stations to limit the spread of contamination outside the site perimeter. Unit commanders use organic decontamination teams, whether or not NBC decontamination units are available. Commanders consider CBRN vapor hazard information and weather data when establishing a perimeter and in locating life support areas for friendly forces. Control lines should be clearly marked and readily identifiable to personnel working in the area. When the local population lives close to the site, barriers to movement are emplaced. As with all obstacles, friendly forces cover these barriers.

1-50. Proximity of displaced persons and other noncombatants to the sensitive site may require placing NBC detection equipment where it can detect hazards to them, or the relocation of these personnel outside of the hazard area. Civil affairs teams and tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) elements can reduce the danger to noncombatants and speed mission accomplishment. Commanders carefully consider the effects of the operation on noncombatants and develop branches in case operations at the site expose the noncombatants to chemical or biological hazards.

1-51. Combat in and around CBRN sites exposes friendly forces and noncombatants to the unintended release of toxic materials. Units assigned

to seize a CBRN-related sensitive site may be placed at additional hazard depending on the enemy's troop strength, capabilities, and intentions. Control of direct fire and precision indirect fires becomes vital to force protection and mission success. Although TTP for offensive combat operations in a CBRN environment apply, the danger to friendly forces is dramatically increased if the enemy decides to release biological or chemical agents, or explode a radiological dispersal device (the so-called "dirty bomb"). An enemy decision to detonate a nuclear device would have obvious and devastating consequences. Early involvement of PSYOP elements may be advisable to force a satisfactory conclusion.

1-52. Unless directed otherwise by their higher headquarters, units treat noncombatant personnel found inside the CBRN site as civilian prisoners. Civilian prisoners are searched, segregated, safeguarded, and evacuated to a place where qualified intelligence personnel can interrogate them and determine their status. If available, U.S. female soldiers perform physical searches of female prisoners. However, the absence of female soldiers does not eliminate the requirement to secure and search female prisoners. Commanders should develop SOPs for female searches in coordination with the staff judge advocate.

1-53. Following the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. forces and international agencies conducted operations at suspected Iraqi CBRN storage areas. Appendix 4 includes excerpts of reports prepared by the Department of Defense concerning these operations.

OTHER SENSITIVE SITES

1-54. Although CBRN sites may be the most dangerous and complex of sensitive sites, they may not be the only category of sensitive site designated by the JFC. Sensitive sites may include suspected war crimes sites, enemy military or political headquarters, research and test facilities for new technology, or sites suspected of harboring enemy leaders or other highly wanted personnel.

SUSPECTED WAR CRIMES SITES

1-55. A war crime is any violation of a law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. The law of war is derived from two principal sources. They come from lawmaking treaties or conventions like the Hague and Geneva Conventions. They also come from a body of unwritten law firmly fixed by the custom of nations and recognized by authorities on international law. More complete information about war crimes and the Geneva Conventions is contained in FM 27-10 and DA Pam 27-1.

1-56. War crimes investigations often have high-level government interest. They generate national and international news media coverage. The determination of a suspected war crime rests with U.S. Government legal officials. However, the process may begin with tactical units discovering a site at which war crimes may have been committed. In World War II, the Vietnam War, and smaller-scale contingencies since, U.S. forces have discovered war crimes areas. In some cases, units overran death camps; in others, local inhabitants led them to mass graves and torture facilities. There

is no standard description of a war crimes site. In general, unit commanders assess the situation and make an initial determination as to whether additional investigation is required. The unit then reports that assessment to higher headquarters and requests additional guidance and assistance, while safeguarding the site.

1-57. The element that discovers a potential war crime scene conducts a sequence of related activities. Tactical units secure the site and eliminate any armed resistance. The unit reports, as accurately as possible, the conditions and indicators at the site. Surviving enemy personnel are taken prisoner, and in the case of an imprisonment facility, separated and safeguarded from the inmates. Soldiers provide assistance to any survivors and victims. The unit commander initiates actions for safeguarding and preserving the scene. Members of the unit record the scene in video, notes, sketches, and photographs. The commander requests assistance from higher headquarters after the initial assessment. Ideally, these activities are done in sequence. In practice, however, circumstances at the site may lead to ongoing, overlapping, almost simultaneous actions. For example, safeguarding the scene from undue change is always one of the first acts taken. Preserving the scene is also an ongoing activity during the search of the scene. If present, survivors and other victims receive treatment as they are found. Enemy forces or other armed elements may be discovered as the area is searched.

1-58. Under the direction of forensics and other experts, or if directed to do so by higher headquarters, the tactical unit searches the scene for evidence—documenting, processing, collecting, and preserving the evidence that is found. The search may unearth fragile items of evidence that must be processed and collected as they are found, rather than after the preliminary search is completed. Finding evidence in an unexpected location may alter the area designated as the war crime scene, expanding and adjusting the area to be searched and safeguarded.

JUDGMENT AND EXPERIENCE

1-59. The number and description of sensitive sites that units may encounter in the course of a major land operation may not be fully enumerated while planning the operation. While the primary type of sensitive site, such as enemy CBRN facilities and weapons, may be adequately addressed, units may encounter situations for which there is little or no guidance. For example, during World War II, Army forces uncovered large caches of stolen art treasures hidden underground by the Nazi Party. In some instances, improper safeguards allowed U.S. soldiers to loot the contents of the area. Commanders use their instincts and professional judgment upon contact with something unexpected. As a minimum, the unit discovering a potential sensitive site should secure the area, safeguard its contents, submit a report describing it, and request guidance from higher headquarters.

Figure 1-4. Kosovo, 1999—U.S. Marines Secure a Mass Grave while Canadian Forensic Experts Excavate the Site (Department of Defense Photo, Defense Link)

Chapter 2

Tactical Operations

Hasty and deliberate sensitive site operations may vary enormously in execution but follow a straightforward tactical sequence. The sequence includes—

- Perform reconnaissance, assess the site, and provide an initial report.
- Perform tactical movement.
- Isolate the site.
- Seize and secure the site.
- Consolidate and reorganize.
- Assess, then access the site
- Exploit the site.
- Neutralize or destroy the site.
- Transition.

HASTY TACTICAL OPERATIONS AT SENSITIVE SITES

2-1. In the course of full spectrum operations, tactical units may either discover a sensitive site or respond to the discovery of a sensitive site by other elements. Based on the factors of METT-TC, units respond to the discovery by applying a variety of tactical skills adjusted to fit the circumstances, using abbreviated planning models to assist and focus the unit. Typically, the tactical unit organizes forces into a reconnaissance element, security element, support element, assault element, and reserve.

2-2. In some cases, the sensitive site operation will combine hasty operations with a deliberate response. Such would be the case when a tactical unit discovers a previously unknown sensitive site, and the joint force or land component has a specially trained and organized force to assault, seize, and secure it. The tactical unit isolates the site, while the special element prepares and moves to attack positions. After the site is secured, the tactical unit continues to isolate the site, and provides support to the site exploitation team.

PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE, ASSESS THE SITE, AND PROVIDE AN INITIAL REPORT

2-3. The most important initial tasks are for the unit commander to understand the situation and make an assessment. Sensitive sites rarely fit a standard template, and the size, nature, and complexity of the site is often not readily apparent. The unit directs reconnaissance to determine the enemy defenses, extent of the site, and terrain factors. Depending upon enemy resistance, reconnaissance elements look for external indicators of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) equipment or facilities. Unit

commanders should exercise caution when contemplating using unit-level nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) survey teams inside suspected CBRN sites. Reasons for this are twofold: the possibility of encountering agents exceeding the protection afforded by the issued individual protective equipment, and due to extreme risks involved in the possibility of contamination transfer outside the facility (for example, from inside a "hot" containment room). Prior to initiating any tactical operations against a suspected enemy CBRN site, the commander does a consequence assessment of the worst-case scenario to determine appropriate schemes of maneuver, personnel protection, downwind hazards, and other potential consequences. This often entails coordination with the higher headquarters to understand what constitutes the worst-case scenario and the associated risks.

2-4. Normally, the unit requests additional surveillance means, particularly aerial surveillance and NBC reconnaissance, to gain an accurate, three-dimensional picture of the site. As soon as the unit has developed an initial assessment of the site, it provides an initial report to its higher headquarters. Reconnaissance continues until the site is secured.

2-5. The critical elements that must be reported include confirmation of conditions at the site, presence/absence of CBRN hazards (if a suspected CBRN site), enemy activities (for example, whether the site is being actively defended), presence of noncombatants, and other significant information. This information can flow via existing operations and intelligence-reporting channels, using existing reporting formats, such as the spot ("SALUTE") report. Hazard information, such as the presence of chemical or radiological contamination, is passed using the NBC report (NBC-1 or NBC-4) appropriate to the situation. These reports help the commander make decisions and help the staff bring in the right mix of subject matter experts and equipment.

PERFORM TACTICAL MOVEMENT

2-6. As the reconnaissance elements carry out their tasks, the remainder of the force moves to assembly areas or attack positions near the site. Enemy activity determines the degree of security required for the movement.

ISOLATE THE SITE

2-7. Based on the initial reconnaissance, the unit isolates the site. Tactically, isolation of a sensitive site is identical to isolating an enemy strongpoint. (See FM 7-10, chapter 4.) Tactical elements assigned to the security forces move to positions from which observation and fires control and block all approaches to the site. High-speed approaches—such as, roads, airfields, and railroads—receive priority. Designated forces occupy these positions and establish blocking positions to stop any attempt at escape or reinforcement. Units select alternate and supplementary positions to defend against any enemy attempt to relieve the site. Even in the case that no armed resistance is expected; the security force prevents interference from the local populace or officials.

2-8. Isolating a sensitive site involves standard offensive doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The encirclement of the site and

the establishment of an effective security area or security cordon around the site are critical to success. Isolation of the site prevents the escape of individuals and removal of contraband materials. It also protects the forces seizing, securing, and clearing the site from outside interference by preventing enemy forces outside the site from reinforcing encircled enemy forces in the site.

2-9. Commanders seek to complete the encirclement of the site without detection. This reduces the time available for an enemy to conceal weapons, materiel, and information, and prepare defenses. Encirclements are easier to accomplish in sparsely populated rural areas than in densely populated urban areas. Commanders may need to use darkness to conceal deployment of cordon forces in urban areas.

2-10. Ideally, the entire site is quickly encircled, with observed fire covering any gaps between security force elements. Commanders employ available direct and indirect fire weapons, including attack helicopters and close air support, to support encirclement and isolation operations, consistent with the rules of engagement (ROE). FM 3-90, appendix D, discusses encirclement operations. FM 3-06.11, chapter 4, discusses cordon and attack operations in urban areas.

SEIZE AND SECURE THE SITE

2-11. Once the site is isolated, the commander decides whether to seize and secure the site with forces on hand or wait for additional forces. Many factors affect the decision, but commanders should coordinate with higher headquarters before attacking. Particularly in the case of a CBRN facility, the tactical unit on the ground may continue to isolate the site while specially selected forces prepare for the assault. In some cases, the attack into the facility may wait for the arrival of subject matter experts to guide and advise the assault teams inside the site.

2-12. In preparation for seizing and securing the site, the commander positions the support force where it can provide overwatching fires to support the assault force. Following the assault, the support force repositions assets to overwatch the site exploitation team and provide support to the site exploitation teams.

2-13. The assault force is task-organized to seize and secure the site. There are tactical considerations that distinguish seizing a sensitive site from seizing an enemy strongpoint. First, fires are carefully controlled so as not to endanger the force by damaging lethal containers on the site. Indirect fires may be limited to precision-effects munitions. Should the contents of the site be important for exploitation, it does no good destroy the site in the attack. Second, there may be noncombatants at the site. These persons may later prove to be war criminals; however, they may have considerable intelligence value. Therefore, tactical operations should be controlled so as to capture as many noncombatants found in the site as possible. Third, as the assault force advances, a follow-on force should secure important structures and facilities until they can be exploited. Teams designated to secure targets must clearly understand their mission and the ROE.

2-14. Maneuver through the objective area should be rapid enough to maintain the initiative but methodical enough to ensure that the site is cleared at the end of the phase. In contrast to the assault of an enemy position, the objective will be thoroughly explored by teams of experts, many of whom may be unarmed civilian specialists. Elimination of all enemy resistance is a necessary precondition for the site exploitation.

2-15. Army forces may encounter complex sensitive sites where it is tactically imprudent to secure and clear an area without expert assistance. For example, a unit may encounter a building suspected of housing biological warfare agents. Even though the unit leaders might suspect that armed enemy personnel are inside, the unit secures the exterior and awaits subject matter experts before continuing inside. In other instances, the unit may discover demolitions or booby traps. Commanders use their judgment and experience to balance force protection and mission accomplishment.

2-16. Commanders retain a small reserve with enough mobility and firepower to reinforce the security, assault, or support elements throughout the operation. When the site is secure, the commander may designate the whole assault force as the reserve.

2-17. FM 3-90, chapter 5, discusses assaulting an objective. The activities described in that chapter apply to the seizure, securing, and clearing of a sensitive site. FM 3-06.11, chapters 3 and 4, provide additional TTP for assaulting objectives in urban environments. These TTP apply to securing facilities at sensitive sites.

CONSOLIDATE AND REORGANIZE

2-18. Once the objective is secured, the unit consolidates and reorganizes to support the site exploitation teams. A primary consideration during consolidation and reorganization is tightening security around the sensitive site, particularly in urban areas. Noncombatants who may have remained in their homes during fighting may attempt to loot the site, or simply appear in and around the site out of curiosity. If the enemy has any tactical capability remaining near the AO, friendly forces must prepare to defeat a counterattack. The risk of a counterattack is greater in urban areas, where enemy soldiers can conceal themselves among the populace.

ASSESS, AND THEN ACCESS THE SITE

2-19. As previously discussed, sensitive sites may be protected by a variety of security measures, including manufactured or improvised mines or explosive devices. Once enemy resistance is eliminated, commanders pause and develop a mobility estimate. Commanders estimate the effort to reduce explosive hazards and barriers protecting the site, and the skills and equipment necessary to gain access to the site. Whenever possible, engineers assist with specialized reconnaissance and advise the commander on requirements. Engineers or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians may be required to clear lanes up to the site or facility, or reduce explosive hazards en route to the site. Engineers may be required to employ controlled explosive techniques to develop access points into the facility before friendly forces can enter a suspected sensitive site.

2-20. In addition to the mobility estimate, commanders update their consequence assessment of the worst-case scenario, based on what they have learned from closer examination of the site. Appropriate protective measures, including evacuation areas, are put into action before entering the site. Commanders and staff work with higher headquarters in updating the estimate.

2-21. Establishing safe access to the sensitive areas of the site allows subject matter experts to complete the exploitation expeditiously.

EXPLOIT THE SITE

2-22. Once the sensitive site is secure, enemy resistance eliminated, and safe access established, exploitation of the site begins. Subject matter experts and teams carefully enter and exploit every structure, facility, and vehicle on the site and determine its value and its hazard to the force. The exploitation teams receive support from the assault element or support element. The security force continues to secure the site. Commanders may elect to rotate the support force, assault force, and security force if the site exploitation lasts several days.

NEUTRALIZE OR DESTROY THE SITE

2-23. Based upon guidance or directives from higher headquarters, friendly forces may destroy or neutralize the site. Destruction is normally carried out when the site is a military facility, weapons storage area, research and production facility, or underground command facility. Experts, either working in specially organized teams or supervising tactical elements, destroy the site. The tactical unit continues to provide security and, on order, expands the secure area to the minimum safe radius required by demolition. (Commanders coordinate with combat engineers or EOD to determine the minimum safe distance.) Following demolition, the commander directs reconnaissance to assess its effectiveness and to document the destruction of the site.

2-24. In circumstances where the sensitive site is not destroyed, site exploitation teams neutralize it. This is normally accomplished by removing all sensitive material from the site and manually destroying selected enemy equipment. In the case of a CBRN facility, experts supported by NBC defense units inspect everything to ensure no contamination remains. Wherever possible, teams decontaminate the area. Usually site neutralization takes longer than destruction due to the requirement to remove material, sort through documents, and decontaminate selected areas.

TRANSITION

2-25. There are three planning scenarios for transition during tactical operations involving a sensitive site:

- **The unit completes the mission**. The site is exploited, neutralized, or destroyed, and the unit receives a subsequent mission from its higher headquarters.
- **The unit is relieved in place by another unit**. In this case, units follow SOP and doctrine for a relief in place. (See FM 3-90, chapter 15.)

- **The unit retrogrades from the site due to deterioration of tactical or physical conditions at the site**. The enemy may conduct a counteroffensive designed to recapture the site. The civil situation may threaten the safety of the force. Or the site itself may pose serious threats to the force—for example, if lethal chemicals or radiation began leaking from storage areas. If these situations occur, the mission of the tactical unit is defense of the site until minimum exploitation is complete and the site is prepared for destruction. Commanders conduct a modified withdrawal. (See FM 3-90, chapter 11.) The security force is reinforced and becomes the detachment left in contact (DLIC). The DLIC continues to defend the site until the other friendly forces have withdrawn. Priority of withdrawal normally goes to prisoners, sensitive material captured at the site, site exploitation teams, the support force, the assault force, and the DLIC.



Figure 2-1. A Task Force Isolates a Suspected Sensitive Site

TACTICAL VIGNETTE

2-26. In figure 2-1, a mechanized TF encounters a possible enemy CBRN facility while engaged in pursuit of beaten enemy forces. The TF consists of

two mechanized infantry companies, one tank company team, and an attached wheeled combat engineer company. Lead elements of the TF have secured the village in the southwest when reconnaissance detects enemy security forces around a facility in a "U" shaped bowl. Much of the facility appears to be in bunkers or underground. The facility is double fenced, but reconnaissance does not detect evidence that the site is mined. The TF commander informs higher headquarters. The brigade, acting on orders from division, issues a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to the TF to discontinue pursuit and prepare to seize and secure the enemy complex. The corps will send a sensitive site exploitation team. The division diverts aerial reconnaissance to the TF AO. The TF commander continues reconnaissance, and issues orders for the TF to encircle the site. A Company in the west and Team Tank in the east encircle and isolate the site. Team B, in the center, moves to attack positions with the engineer company. The TF S2 estimates that the defenders have a weak security company of unknown quality. The enemy has wheeled personnel carriers, and a mix of air defense artillery (ADA) weapons positioned around the site. Remnants of two missile batteries are scattered in the area, but appear to have been abandoned after an air attack. Planning continues for the assault. The TF coordinates for receiving the sensitive site exploitation team and moving them to the vicinity of the attack position.



Figure 2-2. Task Force Attacks to Seize and Secure a Sensitive Site

2-27. In Figure 2-2, the TF has received the sensitive site exploitation team and attacks to seize and secure the suspected sensitive site. In the east, Team Tank attacks to destroy the enemy platoon at the road leading to the site, destroy any remaining ADA, and continue the attack to seize the small airstrip (1). After the airstrip is secure, Team Tank supports Team B by fire and prepares to continue the attack to secure the objective (ADA radar) on the ridgeline. Tank fire concentrates primarily on known and suspected ADA positions. Company A, in the west, occupies a blocking position on the road to the northwest, secures a support-by-fire position overlooking the site on the high ground to the west of the site, and retains one platoon uncommitted as the TF reserve. Team B, in the center, is the decisive operation. Team B initially supports Team Tank by fire from overwatch positions on the low ridge. Fire is coordinated using target reference points (TRPs) designated by the TF. On order, Team B attacks along the left side of their AO to breach the fence, destroy the enemy inside, and seize the facility. The Team B commander uses his tank platoon as the support force in a series of overwatch positions. The infantry platoons and an engineer platoon maneuver to the fence line, breach the fence, and seize each building in succession. The team is prepared for breaching a minefield, but none is found. An electrified fence protects the site, but a TOW missile from the A Company platoon knocks out the generator along the north fence. The attack proceeds methodically, supported by the tank platoon. The engineer company supports the attack. The TF commander establishes a restrictive fire area (RFA) defined by the fence around the site that limits engagement of targets inside the site to direct fire and precision guided munitions requested by the TF. The mortars fire smoke missions around the RFA and provide fire support to the other TF elements. As the attack continues, Team B identifies several entrances to underground facilities. The team secures the entrances but does not enter the tunnels. Captured enemy troops and civilians are restrained, segregated, and moved to prisoner holding areas.

2-28. In figure 2-3, the TF reorganizes for site exploitation. Company B occupies defensive positions in a new AO. The company releases the attached tank platoon to Team Tank. Company B positions one mechanized platoon as the TF reserve. Company A occupies defensive positions in the west. The scout platoon screens to the northwest. Team Tank defends in the east. The engineer company establishes safe access to the site and eliminates enemy demolitions. The engineer unit is direct support (DS) to the TF with priority of effort to the sensitive site exploitation team, then Team Tank. The engineers clear the airstrip to allow for C-130 operations. The TF receives specialized elements to support site exploitation. A civil affairs (CA) team and public affairs (PA) team move to the site. An NBC defense company is now OPCON to the TF. The NBC company establishes a decontamination site, emplaces NBC reconnaissance elements in potential downwind hazard areas, and supports the site exploitation team. A Special Forces team flies in to support sensitive site operations. The site exploitation team expands to deal with the site, which contains highly sensitive material, including chemical weapons and very important intelligence. The site exploitation team estimates that operations to exploit, neutralize, and destroy the site will take 10 days or longer. Based on this assessment, the corps commits a light

infantry battalion to relieve the TF and allow the mechanized TF to resume pursuit operations.



Figure 2-3. Task Force Consolidates, Reorganizes, and Supports Sensitive Site Exploitation

DELIBERATE SENSITIVE SITE OPERATIONS

2-29. The deliberate operation parallels the hasty operation but differs in the degree of planning, preparation, and organization. The unit conducting the operation is normally task-organized into a company team or battalion TF. The unit rehearses site seizure and exploitation using different scenarios. Key capabilities needed to conduct sensitive site exploitation are integrated into the organization. The unit prepares to conduct a wide variety of tactical tasks incident to site exploitation, including searches.

2-30. In terms of execution, deliberate operations normally stress extensive surveillance and reconnaissance, rapid but controlled seizure and clearing of the site, and immediate, careful exploitation.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

2-31. In deliberate operations, a TF or company team is formed before operations start. When the types of sites are known and the number limited, a TF or team may be formed for each site and positioned with maneuver forces expected to encounter the sites. However, the nature of the campaign

and the limited number of resources may result in the formation of one or more special purpose forces for sensitive site exploitation. These forces remain under the control of the division, corps, joint force land component, or ARFOR until a sensitive site is encountered; then they deploy to the site. By organizing and retaining forces for site exploitation in advance, the controlling headquarters enhances the offensive potential of the whole force. Armored and mechanized forces can leave minimum forces in contact with sensitive sites, and assign seizure and exploitation to special TFs. Figure 2-8 illustrates a TF organized for deliberate exploitation of a large sensitive site. Typically, the TF is built around an infantry battalion. In the example above, the TF includes sufficient combat assets to seize and secure a defended site. The site exploitation team includes joint and interagency elements assigned from theater resources. Additional combat and combat support units allow the TF commander to deal with a wide variety of medium and large sites. A primary consideration is TF mobility. The TF should have either the organic assets to permit movement anywhere in the land force AO, or be organized and trained for air movement.



Figure 2-4. Example TF organized for Sensitive Site Operations

2-32. JP 3-11 provides another example of a TF organized for post-hostilities search and recovery operations at CBRN sites. Such TFs may be formed at the direction of the JFLCC and serve as a mobile force intended to continue operations at enemy CBRN facilities, either seized during combat operations or surrendered at the cessation of hostilities. This type of TF might be used to relieve combat units that have captured a sensitive site, like the example in

the vignette. Note the addition of aviation and transportation to move the TF and support the removal of CBRN related weapons, material, and heavy manufacturing equipment. Note also the inclusion of the media pool, which is more likely to be assigned in the absence of anticipated combat. The example search and recovery TF is shown in Figure 2-4.

2-33. The basic unit for conducting most sensitive site exploitation operations will be a team formed around a maneuver combat arms company or troop-sized element. An infantry company is the preferred base organization in urban terrain. Figure 2-5 (page 2-12) provides an example of a company team organized for sensitive site operations. Each company assigned the mission of sensitive site exploitation receives augmentation appropriate to the specific situation. One platoon provides the security element necessary to cordon a company-sized search area. One platoon is normally constitutes the search element, and the third platoon forms the reserve. If commanders expect to encounter significant enemy forces in the AO they increase the combat power of the security force. The reserve requires enough combat power to extract elements of the security force or the search element if they become decisively engaged. If a unit executes sensitive site exploitation outside supporting distance from the force's main body, the commander ordering the sensitive site exploitation provides the sensitive site exploitation team with fire support assets able to move with the team. Language difficulties can interfere when U.S. forces execute operations involving the local populace. Therefore, a higher commander provides combined arms units conducting sensitive site exploitation with interpreters as required. The recording team documents all parts of the site investigation until the technical exploitation team assumes this function. The recording team uses still and video cameras to document the results of the search.



Figure 2-5. Search/Recovery Task Force Sample Organization (From JP 3-11, chapter 5)

2-34. The composition of augmentation elements varies with the nature of the site and available resources. The technical exploitation team may consist of a mixture of Army, joint, and interagency personnel. The interrogation team may come from a military intelligence or military police organization, depending on the nature of the sensitive site. The PSYOP/CA team gives the commander the capability to communicate with enemy or civilian personnel within the site and induce them to collaborate. PSYOP assets can provide significant assistance in this effort by publishing or broadcasting material to influence popular support of the isolation and exploitation effort, and mitigate the perception of inconvenience. PSYOP themes can also foster antipathy towards the enemy forces, guerrillas, terrorists, and sympathizers. When available, a PA team supports the exploitation of the site, although for smaller sites, the PA support may not be attached to the team. Whenever possible, the tactical unit employs translators to assist with the local population. Translators for smaller units will typically be attached from coalition forces.

2-35. In addition to the normal range of equipment, weapons, and ordnance available to tactical units, specialized equipment (and trained operators or advisors, when required) greatly improves site exploitation. The following equipment will assist units tasked with sensitive site operations—



Figure 2-6. Example Company Team Organized for Sensitive Site Operations

- **Seize and secure the site.**
  - Grenades—fragmentary, chemical (HC) smoke, colored smoke, white phosphorus (WP), thermite, and concussion types. Grenades should not be used after friendly forces enter confined spaces—such as, rooms, bunkers, vaults, or tunnels. Thermite grenades may be used to permanently disable enemy equipment captured or abandoned at the site.
  - Obstacle marking material, day and night.
  - Spray paint or other marking material according to unit SOP.
- **Site access and exploitation.**
  - Facility blueprints and as-built drawings to provide the sensitive site exploitation team advanced knowledge of the facility's layout, and to assist with the development of the facility access plan
  - Hand-held thermal viewers or thermal goggles to search tunnels and darkened buildings. (Night vision goggles can be used in conjunction with infrared light sources in the absence of hand-held thermal viewers. The use of regular flashlights in this task is a last resort.) Thermal viewers may also be able to detect heat plumes from air vents.

- Mine detectors and mine-detection dogs—used to detect ammunition and weapon caches, landmines, UXO, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices, whether surface-laid, buried, or hidden.
- Respirators and biological and chemical protective overgarments, if the presence of toxic industrial material, chemical weapons, or biological agents is suspected. (Military protective masks do not protect the wearer from an absence of oxygen—a condition often found in sewers and near large fires.)
- Booby-trap hook-and-line kits, to remotely activate suspected booby traps and hazards.
- Grapnels and ropes. M16-launched grapnel systems are preferred.
- Tactical robot with operators—to enter constricted areas where soldiers cannot go or where the danger to soldiers is extreme. Robots can transmit camera images to commanders and confirm facility plans/layouts. Additionally, robots can be equipped with chemical sensors and other detection equipment to ascertain the risks of facility entry.
- Fire-fighting equipment, including picks, axes, shovels, and portable fire extinguishers.
- Tactical ladders to permit superstructure inspection and entry access above ground level.
- Bolt cutters to cut locks and cables.
- Acetylene torches for cutting through metal doors and bars.
- Video and still digital cameras for use in recording discoveries made during the search.
- Plastic bags for bagging and securing evidence, documents, and computer parts.
- Boxes of rubber gloves (from the medics) for handling evidence.
- Marker tags for labeling equipment and bagged material.
- Police tape or other material for marking exclusion areas.
- Barrier and construction material, to include razor wire, pickets, sandbags, and plywood.

- **Subterranean sites (tunnels and bunkers).**
  - Air generators—used to force smoke into tunnel or cave complexes so that air vents and hidden entrances can be detected. A gas-powered leaf blower can be modified into an expedient smoke projector using smoke grenades.
  - Pistols for use inside constricted tunnels. When available, tunnel teams should use silencers to protect the searcher's ears.
  - Field telephones and communications wire to maintain communication in locations where combat net radios do not work, such as tunnels and caves.
  - Ground-penetrating radar and operator teams to help discover hidden bunkers and tunnels.

- **Prisoner search and detention.**
  - Loudspeakers—used to call enemy and neutrals from buildings, bunkers, or tunnels.
  - Blindfolds and restraints.
  - Hand-held metal detectors for use on female prisoners.
  - Prisoner tags.
- **Site neutralization and destruction.**
  - Demolitions—used to destroy bunkers and tunnel or cave complexes. Because of the complexity of charges needed to destroy some industrial and tunnel complexes, an engineer team should support the search unit. Also, the large amount of demolitions required for some operations may require significant logistic support
  - A variety of smaller explosives and demolitions often prove useful for blowing off locks and opening doors or covers that resist bolt cutters or acetylene torches.

CONTROL MEASURES

2-36. Commanders use standard tactical graphic control measures to describe sensitive site exploitations. (See FM 3-90 and FM 101-5-1.) Units assigned a sensitive site exploitation mission are assigned an AO. The AO may either be specified directly or determined by lateral boundaries, a line of departure, and a limit of advance or forward boundary. Subordinate AOs are not necessarily the same size. Phase lines and contact points, located where the commander determines that it is necessary for adjacent units to make physical contact, are used to coordinate the movement of elements operating in contiguous AOs. Commanders may further designate times for physical contact to take place. Checkpoints can indicate critical terrain features and can be used to coordinate air and ground operations. Commanders designate an RFA around a suspected or discovered sensitive site to preclude friendly fires from accidentally damaging or destroying the site. A *restrictive fire area* is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Commanders establish the restrictions on the type of ordnance to be employed within the sensitive site when they establish the RFA. Commanders use other graphic control measures and fire support coordinating measures as necessary to control unit maneuver and fires. All control measures should be on recognizable terrain when possible. Figure 2-6 depicts the control measures commonly associated with sensitive site exploitation in an urban environment.



Figure 2-7. Example Control Measures used in an Urban Environment

SEARCH OPERATIONS

2-37. The need to search each sensitive site is the primary difference between sensitive site exploitation and routine follow-through activities performed during offensive operations. In contrast to the aftermath of an ambush, for example, friendly forces remain and conduct a detailed examination of the physical objective, recording the condition and contents of the site for exploitation. Search activities occur regardless of whether the sensitive site was detected before operations started or discovered during execution of an operation.

2-38. Once the objective area is secure, commanders organize a careful search of the site. The objectives of the search are threefold: (1) Ensure that all enemy resistance is eliminated. (2) Assess the nature of the captured sensitive site and determine the support required for exploitation. (3) Determine the potential risks to the force occupying the site. Search operations are executed slowly enough to allow an effective search but fast enough to prevent the enemy from reacting. Search teams use the minimum essential force needed to eliminate active resistance encountered during the search. The objective of this initial search by the tactical forces is to assess the sight and identify potential hazards and areas that merit closer examination. Exploitation team elements can return to a searched area after

the initial search to investigate the contents more thoroughly as the exploitation continues. Search teams conduct a thorough search of underground and underwater areas within the sensitive site. Any freshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets, should be treated as if booby-trapped until proved safe. Mine detectors and ground penetrating radar can be used to locate metal objects underground and, to a limited extent, underwater.

2-39. Security at the sensitive site is maintained throughout the exploitation. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established and maintained. Subsurface escape and movement routes in built-up areas, such as subways and sewers, need to be searched and blocked.

2-40. Commanders consult with higher headquarters on the degree of intrusiveness used by searchers with the local populace. In general, the greater the hazards posed by the site, the more intrusive the search of the populace living in or around the site. Discipline becomes a paramount consideration during searches. Commanders reinforce ROE and exercise tight control, particularly when confronted with possible war crimes. All of the potential informational value from a sensitive site may be obscured in an instant by acts of indiscipline committed against unarmed individuals.

2-41. Large-scale searches of built-up areas should be planned and rehearsed in detail. Information about the terrain is obtained from aerial photographs. In larger towns or cities, the local police or public works departments might have detailed maps showing relative sizes and locations of buildings. Success requires simple search plans and swift execution. Three techniques are used to search populated areas:

- **Assemble inhabitants in a central location if they appear to be hostile.** This technique provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies hostiles an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. It has the disadvantage of taking inhabitants away from their homes, thus encouraging looting which, in turn, engenders ill feelings.
- **Restrict inhabitants to their homes**. A restriction prevents movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their homes, and discourages looting. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence.
- **Control the heads of the households**. The head of each household is told to remain in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team through the house. Looting is reduced, and the head of the household sees that the search team steals nothing. This is the best method for controlling the populace during a search.

SEARCHING A RESIDENCE

2-42. The object of a house search is to screen residents to determine if any are suspected hostiles or sympathizers and to look for controlled items. Search parties assigned to search an occupied building should consist of at

least one local policeman, a protective escort, and a female searcher. Escort parties and transportation are arranged before the search. Forced entry may be necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. If a house containing property is searched while its occupants are away, it should be secured to prevent looting. Before U.S. forces depart, commanders arrange for the community to protect such houses until the occupants return.

SEARCH OF INDIVIDUALS

2-43. The fact that anyone in an area to be searched could be hostile or a sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However, to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may support the host-nation government, searchers are tactful. The greatest caution is required during the initial handling of a person about to be searched. One member of the search team covers the other member, who makes the actual search. (FM 3-19.40and STP 19-95B1-SM discuss the procedure for searching people.)

SEARCH OF FEMALES

2-44. Enemies may use females for all types of tasks when they think civilians will be searched. To counter this, use female searchers. If female searchers are not immediately available, females to be searched should be segregated until female searchers can be used. In many cultures a male searching a female will significantly alienate the populace and counter any goodwill friendly forces may have fostered to that point. If male soldiers must search females, all possible measures must be taken to prevent any inference of sexual molestation or assault.

SEARCH OF VEHICLES

2-45. Searching vehicles may require special equipment, such as, detection devices, mirrors, and tools. Specially trained dogs may be used to locate drugs or explosives. A thorough search of a vehicle is time-consuming. Commanders consider the effect on the population. A separate vehicle search area can be established to avoid unnecessary delays.

AERIAL SEARCH OPERATIONS

2-46. Search units mounted in armed helicopters take full advantage of the mobility and firepower of these aircraft. Air assault combat patrols executing an aerial search reconnoiter an assigned area or route. When a patrol locates an enemy force, the patrol may engage it from the air or may land and engage it on the ground. This technique has little value in areas of dense vegetation or when a significant man-portable air defense threat is present. Use of air assault combat patrols should be used only in operations when sufficient intelligence is available to justify their use. Even then, such patrols should be used along with ground operations.

Chapter 3

Planning Considerations

Operations involving sensitive sites are variations of normal tactical operations. All planning steps and considerations for full spectrum operations apply. The considerations discussed below may help commanders and planners anticipate the effects of sensitive site operations on normal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Sensitive site exploitation plans focus on common offensive planning consideration outlined in FM 3-90, chapter 3. This includes securing the objective area (establishing a cordon) and for handling detained personnel.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-1. An immediate issue confronting commanders in hasty sensitive site operations is the need to alter the task organization to meet the complex requirements of sensitive site exploitation. The commander must ensure that the sensitive site exploitation team receives all required support quickly and efficiently. In instances where the site exploitation team is a military formation, the commander assigns elements of the force to the operational control (OPCON) of the site exploitation team. The tactical unit retains control of the external security forces and reserve. This is the preferred command and control arrangement.

3-2. In other cases—such as where the site exploitation team is made up largely of interagency specialists, particularly if the teams are not part of a single organization—commanders improvise. In the case of a battalion, the commander may create a multifunctional site team and designate a unit commander or staff officer to control it. That officer coordinates site exploitation and allocates support as required. The purpose of that organization is to ensure smooth coordination inside the site. Even though the ad hoc coordinator is not an expert, his or her function is to organize the military support to the exploitation teams, prioritize competing demands, and provide life support and close security for the site exploitation team.

3-3. Sensitive sites may be located by SOF elements that remain in the area to develop the situation. Tactical units moving to the site initially coordinate through their higher headquarters to establish contact with the SOF element. The special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) normally located at corps or division acts as the interface between SOF in the AO and the tactical unit until direct contact is established between the team and the tactical unit. Using the SOCOORD as the interface, the tactical unit approaching the site confirms frequencies, recognition signals, linkup procedures, and control measures such as no fire areas (NFA). The SOF element may remain to assist with site exploitation or be extracted by its

parent headquarters. The tactical unit assists the SOF element with extraction and immediate support as required.

SIGNAL

3-4. Normal signal support should be sufficient for the tactical requirements of the attacking unit. If feasible, the signal support should be enhanced to allow for live or prerecorded video transmission between teams on the ground and remote locations. Video transmission allows the higher headquarters to assess the site and develop orders. Under some circumstances, subject matter experts will not be available for site exploitation. In those cases, units establish a secure video link-up between unit teams on-site and subject matter experts located elsewhere in the area of operations (AO) or in the continental United States (CONUS). These off-site subject matter experts could then "talk" the unit through the site, identifying equipment, documents, and items of interest for destruction, retrograde, or further exploitation. This technique could also be used to prioritize the sites that subject matter experts would visit.

MANEUVER

3-5. Sensitive site exploitation often involves the combined arms unit searching the site after the site is cleared. (This search normally occurs under the direction of the sensitive site exploitation team.) If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it informs the commander assigning the mission. That commander then issues further guidance on which tasks to complete or prioritizes the tasks. If, after starting the mission, the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, it reports and awaits further instructions.

3-6. The size of the sensitive site is a crucial planning consideration. Commanders given a mission involving a sensitive site are assigned an AO that includes the site and enough terrain around it for their units to maneuver to accomplish the mission. Ideally, the AO is smaller than the commander's area of influence. A commander should not assign an objective to a subordinate unit larger than the unit can seize and secure. This is especially true for operations involving sensitive sites. A force assigned the mission of seizing and securing a sensitive site must be large enough to control the entire site. By definition, a sensitive site is important enough to allocate the forces necessary to control it. When deciding the size of urban AOs, commanders consider their three-dimensional aspects (front, flanks, rear, upper stories, rooftops, and subsurface).

3-7. Units involved in sensitive site exploitation plan how they will seize and dispose of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other minor items collected during this mission. Seizure and disposition of such items is performed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; the misuse of authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations. Proper use of search authority and respect for local customs during sensitive site exploitation can gain the respect and support of the people; improper use of search authority or lack of respect for local customs will lose the respect and support of the local populace. Search teams require detailed instructions for

handling controlled items. Lists of prohibited or controlled-distribution items should be widely disseminated and on hand during searches.

3-8. Attack aviation provides powerful and flexible close support during sensitive site operations. Their presence often intimidates defenders and may allow tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) to effect surrender without an assault. Precision fires from a variety of weapons, maneuvered from ranges and angles only achieved from the air, may allow assault forces to destroy defenders without damaging critical facilities. Attack helicopters can dominate the rooftops and high ground in the sensitive site, forcing defenders to less advantageous positions and allowing air assaults directly on key targets.

3-9. Assault and medium lift aviation provide support to maneuver forces isolating and securing the site. During site exploitation, lift aviation assets support rapid evacuation of important material and personnel discovered at the site. Commanders should secure and mark landing zones very close to the site.

FIRE SUPPORT

3-10. Operations involving sensitive sites require carefully balancing overwhelming firepower with controlled maneuver. Defending enemy forces must be suppressed to permit maneuver, but some facilities must remain intact to protect friendly forces or permit exploitation. There are no standard solutions; each site encountered presents different challenges. Commanders consider the following:

- Plan for fire support coordinating measures and AOs together. Designate an AO for the operation. The AO should encompass the sensitive site and the surrounding terrain necessary to control and isolate it. Within the AO, use restrictive fire areas (RFAs) to safeguard important facilities.
- Plan for precision fires on targets in the sensitive site. Use of precision munitions allows for selective destruction of targets while preserving adjacent structures or areas.
- Plan for control of fires in support of the assault force and the security force. In the case of a company-sized element, additional combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) may be required if precision fires are needed.
- Coordinate with experts on the nature of the contents and potential targets inside the site to determine the appropriate fire support means.

INTELLIGENCE

3-11. Information on suspected sensitive sites should be requested and developed well in advance of anticipated operations. Extensive coordination may be necessary to obtain it. For some contingencies, the Department of State or United Nations weapons storage site inspection databases can provide a starting point for determining potential sensitive site locations. Units require listings of known/suspected sites to incorporate into their IPB. Comprehensive intelligence and analysis of potential sensitive sites should be

collaboratively developed across the command and disseminated as part of the theater intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

3-12. A fundamental intelligence challenge is to provide useable information to tactical units on what to look for at various sensitive sites. Some sites will be known in advance and detailed intelligence on those sites provided to units assigned to deal with them. Other sites, however, may be known only by activity or function. The intelligence system provides indicators to the tactical units that distinguish different sensitive sites from more mundane areas on the battlefield.

3-13. Units should request and refine a list of potential supporting agencies and joint forces that may be required for sensitive site exploitation as early as possible.

3-14. Unit intelligence officers should address the classification problems (PERSEC and INFOSEC considerations)—both internal and external—as early in the planning as possible. Complete instructions include information-sharing requirements and common database/tools usage. This is a theater/joint responsibility.

3-15. The location and nature of sensitive sites, especially chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sites, will normally be one of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Information requirements that address sensitive sites are always part of the priority intelligence requirements (PIR). After encountering a sensitive site, commanders should evaluate their information requirements and adjust them to circumstances on the ground. For example, an entire set of PIR may result from discovering a large war crimes site.

3-16. Review available intelligence and work closely with counterintelligence specialists to prepare and disseminate updated lists of important hostile civilians, either by name or category. Even though the identity of the individuals may be unknown before the operation, a description of categories will be useful to tactical intelligence units supporting the operation. Correlated with other intelligence, these lists will assist tactical commanders with the problem of noncombatants in and around a sensitive site.

3-17. Develop target folders for each known site and ensure dissemination to the unit preparing for sensitive site exploitation mission. The folders should contain the following:

- Latest imagery of the site.
- Latest current and historical intelligence of the site and its surrounding/supporting facilities or areas.
- Site diagram. Include any information on physical barriers and obstacles. Provide an assessment of the likelihood of enemy demolitions or booby traps.
- Entrances to and exits from the site.
- Amount and type of buildings on the site. Whenever available, include building plans, and underground utilities plans. Details on structures may be obtained from local offices.

- Suspected type of site (for example, CBRN research, production, storage, command and control, headquarters, intelligence collection, signal).
- Expected items at the site that may require seizure, for example documents. The general nature and description of the items should be included in terms understood by small unit leaders.
- Enemy control mechanisms. If military, what unit controls the site? If civilian, what agency/bureau controls the site? Include any known information on occupants of the site and a description of the local populace.
- Logistic support to the site. What supplies and utilities are provided to the site? From where do the supplies and utilities originate? Where are the best locations, and what are the best means, of interdicting logistics to the site? This information is critical if the mission includes preventing interdiction of utilities and supplies once the sensitive site has been secured.
- Key personnel who may be encountered at the site.
- Downwind hazard area/contaminated areas/training areas/test areas/ranges, etc. in the vicinity of the site.
- When the AO contains sites that have been subject to multinational inspections, all historical data from those inspections.

3-18. Include clear guidance in plans and orders concerning the capture or seizure of items of interest, such as, equipment, documents, automation equipment, personal electronic devices.

MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY

3-19. Whenever circumstances allow, engineers should be included in sensitive site exploitation teams. In hasty operations, the maneuver force assigned to seize and secure the site should request engineer support. Engineers have many potential roles in operations involving sensitive sites:

- Combat engineers support the attack with mobility operations.
- Engineers support exploitation by ensuring mobility and site access.
- Engineers assist the force by identifying and preparing barriers to isolate the site, particularly when the site is located in or near an urban area.
- Engineers provide surface and subsurface reconnaissance before and after the site is secured. Engineer expertise is very important in the case of damaged structures; commanders should use engineers to mark unsafe structures.
- Engineer support may be required to remove material from the site.
- Engineers work with the site exploitation team to destroy the site after exploitation.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

3-20. Combined arms units involved in sensitive site exploitation should plan for possible exposure to toxic industrial material and weapons of mass

destruction components. An extensive list of toxic industrial materials, their associated international identification symbols, and immediate action drills on exposure are at the U.S. Department of Transportation Emergency Responders Guide website (http://hazmat.dot.gov/gydebook.htm). Toxic industrial materials normally have a greater downwind hazard distance at night.

3-21. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and defense units should be part of any tactical operations involving CBRN sites. Experience in the Gulf War and afterwards has demonstrated the value of mobile NBC teams equipped with purpose-built platforms like the FOX system. Sensitive site exploitation teams also require Army biological detection and defense teams to support activities inside any suspected CBRN facility. These teams may consist of technical escort unit (TEU) personnel that can conduct sampling, packaging, and escort of chemical and biological materials back to a theater army medical laboratory (TAML) or to CONUS for further analysis or verification.

3-22. Decontamination support for personnel and equipment must be provided at CBRN sites. Normally, the supporting NBC units identify suitable sites and request that the tactical unit secure the area. Whenever feasible, the decontamination area should be inside the security force perimeter. The NBC unit commander assesses the situation and determines if area decontamination is required. If required, specially equipped NBC units can decontaminate large areas.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3-23. Historical experience indicates that explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams will be required at many sites. EOD remains a highly trained but limited resource in theater. Tactical commanders plan in advance for EOD support. In cases where EOD is not available for integration into the TF, senior tactical commanders should plan for the formation and movement of EOD teams to sensitive sites.

3-24. The threat of enemy CBRN materials and weapons requires additional NBC defense equipment and consumables. Prolonged operations at a CBRN site will consume protective ensembles, batteries, demolitions, and barrier materials.

3-25. Some war crimes sites will require mortuary affairs teams to support forensic investigators. In addition, the mortuary teams may assist CA with dignified return of remains to appropriate authorities.

3-26. Exploitation of a large sensitive site normally requires additional transportation resources to evacuate material and transport specialized equipment to and from the site. Once exploitation begins, the unit S4 coordinates with the site exploitation team to determine transportation requirements.

3-27. The TAML should be contacted for support through corps or equivalent headquarters. The TAML provides the following support:

- Advise commanders on potential radiological risk.
- Develop radiological sampling plans.

- Environmental sampling and surveys, to include instrument surveys, and soil, air, and water sampling. This includes initial screening of samples for gross contamination.
- Sample-result interpretation and radiological dose estimation.
- Bioassay sampling.
- Radiological isotope identification.
- Identification of radioactive sources in foreign equipment.
- Radiation safety training.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

3-28. *Information operations* are actions taken to affect adversaries and influence others' decision making processes, information, and information systems, while protecting one's own information and information systems (FM 3-0). Information operations are used offensively and defensively. Offensive information operations can help to seize and secure the sensitive site while defensive information operations counter misinformation and propaganda that can cause fear and mistrust among the local population and the American people. Tactical units involved in sensitive site operations use information operations and related activities to create and preserve conditions for successful sensitive site exploitation. Within the context of the campaign, successful sensitive site exploitation may contribute theater information superiority and provide the basis for information operations at theater level. At the strategic level, the outcome of sensitive site operations may shape the use of the instruments of national power, which include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means.

Information Operations Elements

- Operations security
- Psychological operations
- Counterpropaganda
- Military deception
- Counterdeception
- Electronic warfare
- Computer network attack
- Physical destruction
- Information assurance
- Computer network defense
- Physical security
- Counterintelligence

Information Operations Related Activities

- Civil Affairs
- Public Affairs

3-29. Information operations elements are not organizations, but a collection of independent activities that, when taken together and synchronized, constitute effective information operations. All elements may not be required for each operation; however for those elements selected to support an operation, —planning, integration, and synchronization are critical to successful execution. Information operations support sensitive site operations and therefore information operations planning, targeting, and execution should be planned, and representatives identified. An example information operations cell structure is in Annex E.

3-30. Information operations create effects that can support all phases of sensitive site operations. Information operations can support the isolate

phase by denying communications with outside sources; seizing the site by degrading the will or desire to resist; and securing the site by helping control local population perceptions. It is important to keep in mind that many of the information operations elements require some specific intelligence and information to develop a viable plan.

3-31. The rules of engagement affect the means used and the effects sought in any given situation. The following effects are possible using information operations.

- **Destroy**. *Destroy* is to damage a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90). Destruction is most often the use of lethal and nonlethal means to physically render adversary information useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted. It is most effective when timed to occur just before adversaries need to execute a command and control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute.
- **Disrupt**. *Disrupt* is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90). *Disrupt*, in information operations, means breaking or interrupting the flow of information between selected C2 nodes. Disruption may be the desired effect when attack resources are limited, to comply with rules of engagement, or to create certain effects. Electronic attack is a common means of disrupting adversary C2 systems.
- **Degrade**. *Degrade*, in information operations, is using lethal or - temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary command and control systems, and information collection efforts or means (FM 3-13). Offensive information operations can also degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the target's worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and actions.
- **Deny**. *Deny*, in information operations, entails withholding information about Army force capabilities and intentions that adversaries need for effective and timely decision –making (FM 3-13). Effective denial leaves opponents vulnerable to offensive capabilities. Operations security is the primary nonlethal means of denial. It applies throughout the spectrum of conflict.
- **Deceive**. *Deceive* is to cause a person to believe what is not true (FM 3-13). Military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their understanding of reality. Successful deception causes them to believe what is not true.
- **Exploit**. *Exploitation*, in information operations, is gaining access to adversary command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information (FM 3-13).
- **Influence**. *Influence* causes adversaries or others to behave in a manner favorable to Army forces (FM 3-13). It results from applying perception management to affect the target's emotions, motives, and reasoning. Perception management also seeks to influence the target's perceptions, plans, actions, and will to oppose friendly forces. Targets

may include noncombatants and others in the AO whom commanders want to support friendly force missions or not resist friendly force activities. Perception management achieves the influence effect by conveying or denying selected information to targets

3-32. Tactical units involved in sensitive site operations will use operations security (OPSEC), may employ PSYOP and electronic warfare, and support civil military operations and public affairs. PSYOP and OPSEC will be employed to influence adversary decision makers or groups while protecting friendly decision-making. Electronic warfare may be employed to affect enemy information systems and information that supports decision makers, weapon systems, C2, and automated responses. Civil military operations and public affairs are related activities to information operations. These activities provide tools with which commanders inform local and global populations of the operation. Although computer network operations may also shape sensitive site operations, the joint force commander or higher headquarters controls them. FM 3-13 provides greater detail on the conduct of information operations at all levels.

TACTICAL PSYOP

3-33. Tactical PSYOP support has proven an effective combat multiplier in most recent operations. When available, tactical PSYOP should be used to support sensitive site operations with two primary tasks:

> ***Psychological operations*** **are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives (JP 3-53).**

- Combine PSYOP with a demonstration of overwhelming combat power to convince enemy forces to surrender. In many cases, defenders, aware that they have been left behind in the face of a powerful American offensive, are susceptible to psychological influence. If they can be induced to surrender, not only will then site be preserved, but also additional intelligence can be obtained from prisoners.
- Actively support civil affairs teams in situations involving the local populace. (See FM 41-10.)

3-34. Tactical PSYOP provides other complimentary capabilities that may prove particularly useful in sensitive site operations. As offensive information operations, PSYOP transmit information that may degrade the morale and effectiveness of adversary commanders and units. As defensive information operations, PSYOP can be used to deny adversary exploitation of the target population. PSYOP missions include—

- Projecting a favorable image of U.S. actions by informing friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences in both denied areas and friendly areas.

- Bypassing censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications systems to convey messages to target audiences.
- Influence adversary civil populations not to interfere with friendly force efforts.
- Reduce collateral damage by giving instructions to noncombatants in the combat zone.
- Targeting adversaries to—
  - Degrade their morale.
  - Reduce their will to resist.
  - Discourage them from employing certain kinds of weapons, such as WMD.
  - Offer alternatives to continued resistance
  - Exploiting ethnic, cultural, religious, or economic differences among civilians and military at a sensitive site.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

3-35. Sensitive site operations conducted close to civilian populations usually require CA support. Even in cases where a CA team cannot come to the site, the CA specialists can advise the commander on operations in and around the populace. The CA teams should work in conjunction with PSYOP teams after the site is secure to help commanders control the local populace. (See FM 3-05.30.)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3-36. Sensitive site operations normally require PA support. Even if PA teams are committed to supporting higher headquarters, PA support should be provided via electronic links to the units conducting sensitive site exploitation. The primary task of PA is to provide truthful and accurate information to the domestic and global audience about military operations. In the case of sensitive sites, this becomes vital. PA supports and buffers tactical units confronting intense media scrutiny. The discovery and exploitation of enemy sensitive sites may have a powerful influence on a variety of audiences. Often, the discovery of what the enemy most wanted hidden can undermine hostile popular sentiment and debunk misguided information campaigns waged on behalf of the adversary. PA become the primary conduit through which the facts concerning the site reach the global audience. PA officers work to dispel rumors, half-truths, and enemy propaganda that distort perceptions of the situation. Effective PA actions allow units to continue site exploitation with minimum distraction.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

3-37. The three major components of electronic warfare are electronic protection, electronic warfare support, and electronic attack. When tactical circumstances permit, division and corps headquarters allocate electronic warfare assets to support operations at sensitive sites. Like other combat activities, electronic warfare is limited by the rules of engagement. See FM 3-13 for a complete discussion of electronic warfare support to operations.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

3-38. The ROE should include provisions that apply to noncombatants and the security of sensitive sites in different situations. For example, security of a war crimes area may include ROE that allows for arrest and detention of violators of a security zone, but not deadly force, except in self-defense. At a captured CBRN facility, troops may be authorized to use deadly force to preclude unauthorized entry to site when other measures fail.

3-39. The tactical unit at the site does not develop ROE; it carries them out. However, unit commanders must ensure that the ROE are appropriate to their unit's tactical situation and that the ROE are communicated to the entire force. If commanders have any doubts concerning the application of force at the site, they should request clarification or modification through staff judge advocate channels.

SITE PRESERVATION

3-40. Units should think of sensitive sites as highly dynamic. They undergo change and are fragile; the evidence value of items at the site can easily be lost. Usually, there is only one chance to search a scene properly. Making a good preliminary survey helps to use that chance to best advantage. Good surveys take into account all information and opinions from those who discovered the site. They focus on the apparent physical focal point or points of the site.

A Technique used in Afghanistan

One commander told his soldiers to treat captured sensitive sites like the crime scenes in a popular forensics crime show on television. The soldiers then understood the critical requirement to preserve the site for expert exploitation.

3-41. In the case of possible war crimes sites, the site survey determines the perceptions of subject matter experts as to what items and material have potential evidence value. Preferably without entering the more critical areas of the site, those performing the survey make a preliminary examination, noting the items, conditions, and locations that seem to have the greatest importance. The key actions of those performing the survey are to observe and record. The position of items in relation to each other and to victims can be as important as the items themselves. Designated troops should record where everything is located. All material taken from the site should be tagged with information listing where it was found, circumstance, and the individual handling it. (Field expedient tags may be used in lieu of evidence tags) It is useful to photograph the scene. Appendix B contains more tips for site preservation.

RECEPTION AND SUPPORT OF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND TEAMS

3-42. The tactical unit commander may be given the mission of securing a sensitive site pending the arrival of a subject matter expert or team of subject matter experts. In such instances, the unit will likely be tasked to receive the

subject matter experts and support their activities at the site. This section discusses the types of activities that tactical unit commanders may be required to perform in receiving and supporting subject matter expert activities. Many of these will require additional resources or task-organization to conduct activities beyond the unit's organic capabilities.

3-43. Reception activities begin upon the subject matter expert team's arrival at the sensitive site and generally consist of those activities required to orient the subject matter expert team to the site (such things as the location and layout of the site, condition of the site, and the presence of enemy combatants or noncombatants at the site), provide them with life support (depending on the length of their anticipated stay), providing site security, confirming support roles and responsibilities of the various participants, establishing access and contamination control measures, and possibly conducting rehearsals of activities to be performed on-site. The supporting unit commander should plan on providing, at a minimum, billeting, class I support, limited class III support, communications support, and emergency medical support. The subject matter expert team should meet early with any unit-level teams that have been inside the site.

3-44. The subject matter expert team will likely arrive without the means of sustaining itself for a significant period of time; therefore this responsibility falls on the supporting units. Support requirements will generally fall into the following categories:

- Augmentation of the subject matter expert team by selected members of the supported unit. Unit members should receive training as necessary on their assigned tasks and rehearse them as necessary. Examples of these activities are the lifting and removal of site equipment, measuring or photographing reaction vessels, inventory of weapons storage yards, GPS (global positioning system) readings, and note-taking.
- The tactical unit commander should request additional resources from military police, chemical decontamination, combat engineers, EOD, PA (to document conditions at the site), and other units to assist in these efforts, as appropriate.

Appendix A

Related Tasks

This appendix lists tasks related to operations involving sensitive sites from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), Army Universal Task List (AUTL), and infantry battalion and company mission training plans (MTPs). It includes a draft task proposed for addition to the AUTL.

JOINT TASKS

A-1. The UJTL (CJCSM 3500.04C) lists the following tasks related to operations involving sensitive sites. It categorizes tasks at the following levels: strategic-national (SN), strategic-theater (ST), and operational (OP).

STRATEGIC-NATIONAL TASKS

SN 2.2 Collect Strategic Information

SN 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for R&D and Force Planning

SN 8.1.12 Coordinate Counterproliferation Programs and Activities

STRATEGIC-THEATER TASKS

ST 1.3.4 Integrate Direct Action in Theater

ST 9.1 Integrate Efforts to Counter Weapons and Technology Proliferation in Theater

ST 9.6 Integrate Theater ISR with the CBRNE Weapon Situation

OPERATIONAL TASKS

OP 1.2.4.7 Conduct Direct Action in the JOA

OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials

OP 7.5 Integrate JOA ISR with CBRNE Situation

ARMY TASKS

A-2. The AUTL (FM 7-15) lists Army tactical tasks (ARTs) performed by units and staffs at corps level and below. Infantry mission training plans include tasks normally performed by infantry units.

ARMY UNIVERSAL TASK LIST

ART 1.2.4 Support Sensitive Site Exploitation (See draft task, below.)

ART 1.3.3.1 Conduct a Zone Reconnaissance

ART 1.3.3.2 Conduct an Area Reconnaissance

ART 8.1.1.2 Conduct a Search and Attack

ART 8.1.2.6 Conduct a Raid

BATTALION TASK FORCE LEVEL TASKS (ARTEP 7-20-MTP)

07-1-1018A Conduct a Cordon and Search in an Urban Area (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

07-1-1099 Conduct a Raid (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

07-1-6018 Conduct Operational Decontamination (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

07-1-5090 Conduct Risk Management (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

07-1-6072 Secure Civilians During Operations (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

07-1-1180 Conduct an Attack of a Built-up Area (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force)

COMPANY LEVEL TASKS (ARTEP 7-10-MTP)

07-2-2018 Conduct an Area or Zone Reconnaissance (Infantry Company)

07-2-2054 Reconnoiter a Built-up Area (Infantry Company)

07-2-1027 Conduct a Cordon and Search in a Built-up Area (Infantry Company)

07-2-1135 Conduct a Raid (Infantry Company)

07-2-1261 Conduct an Attack of a Built-up Area (Infantry Company)

07-2-1306-A Conduct Operations during Limited Visibility (Antiarmor/ Infantry Company)

07-2-1351 Conduct Tactical Movement in a Built-up Area (Infantry Company)

07-2-1378 Defend in an Urban Environment (Infantry Company)

07-2-6036 Cross an NBC Contaminated Area (Infantry Company)

07-2-6144 Conduct Operational Decontamination (Antiarmor/Infantry Company)

07-2-4027 Handle Enemy Prisoners of War (Infantry Company)

07-2-4045 Process Captured Documents and Equipment (Infantry Company)

07-2-4054 Secure Civilians During Operations (Antiarmor/Infantry Company)

07-2-4063 Treat and Evacuate Casualties (Antiarmor/Infantry Company)

07-2-5063 Conduct Risk Management (Infantry Company)

ART 1.2.4 SUPPORT SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION (DRAFT)

A-3. Sensitive site exploitation consists of a related series of activities inside a sensitive site captured from an adversary. A sensitive site is a designated, geographically limited area with special military, diplomatic, economic, or information sensitivity for the United States, such as factories with technical data on enemy weapon systems, war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government or organization, terrorist money laundering, and document storage areas for secret police forces. These activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. While the physical process of exploiting the sensitive site begins at the site itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located around the world. (FM 3-90.XX) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Exploitation of the sensitive site supports U.S. operational or strategic political, military, economic, and informational goals.
02	Yes/No	The unit supporting the exploitation of the sensitive site has isolated, seized, secured, and cleared the site or has relieved a unit that performed those tactical missions prior to exploiting the site under the technical direction of a subject matter experts.
03	Yes/No	Enemy or adversary knows that the site has been exploited by U.S. forces.
04	Yes/No	Tactical unit tasked-organized itself appropriately to accomplish the mission of supporting the exploitation of the sensitive site and compensate for losses.
05	Yes/No	Enemy or adversary was not able to exfiltrate sensitive equipment or material from the sensitive site.
06	Yes/No	Unit supporting the sensitive site exploitation did not suffer casualties as a result of a failure to properly manage the risks associated with the site.
07	Yes/No	Enemy or adversary was not able to destroy sensitive equipment, material, and documents, or purge computers of sensitive information prior to the site being secured.
08	Yes/No	Commander of the unit supporting the exploitation of the sensitive site maintains his situational understanding throughout the operation.
09	Yes/No	Members of the unit supporting the exploitation have access to a high fidelity common operational picture throughout the operation, consistent with operations security.
10	Yes/No	Leaders of the unit supporting the exploitation of the sensitive site use the military decision making process or troop leading procedures correctly, to include the identification of search locations, security positions, boundaries, and fire support coordinating measures. The battlefield operating systems are coordinated and synchronized.
11	Yes/No	Unit conducts operations in accordance with established rules of engagement and consideration of the nature of the sensitive site.
12	Yes/No	Unit records the results of the search and appropriately disseminates the results.
13	Yes/No	Unit supporting the exploitation of the site appropriately kills, captures, or detains

No.	Scale	Measure
		enemy soldiers, adversaries, sensitive individuals, and neutrals within the site.
14	Time	Necessary to isolate the sensitive site and the forces and individuals located inside the site from outside physical, informational, and psychological support.
15	Time	Necessary to seize the sensitive site.
16	Time	Necessary to secure the sensitive site.
17	Time	Necessary to search the sensitive site.
18	Time	Necessary to establish liaison with and deploy technical experts to the sensitive site.
19	Percent	Of potential sensitive personnel, equipment, material, documents, and electronically stored files located within the site discovered during the search of the sensitive site.

Appendix B

Tips for Site and Evidence Preservation

Under normal conditions, trained law enforcement personnel or military police soldiers perform site and evidence preservation. (See FM 3-19.1 and FM 19-20.) When operational necessity requires other soldiers to perform these tasks, follow the guidance in this appendix.

PERFORMING SEARCHES

B-1. Preferably without entering the more critical areas of the scene, tactical elements should make a preliminary examination, noting the items, conditions, and locations that seem to have the greatest importance to the case. Key actions at this stage of the search are to observe and record. The position of items in relation to each other and to a victim, if any, can be as important to the case as the items themselves. Note where everything is located. It is useful to photograph the scene at this time.

B-2. Obtain statements from witnesses, including background information on victims. Witnesses' descriptions of things that they observed should be amplified, by photographs when possible. Be sure the camera is positioned to take photographs from the witnesses' perspective. Note lighting conditions and any measurements that may tend to support or disprove the witnesses' statements.

B-3. If the search is lengthy set aside an area, close by but outside the critical area, to use as a collection point for trash generated in the search. Equipment not in immediate use should be placed in this area. Personnel may also use the area to take breaks and smoke. Using such an area reduces the chance of contaminating the scene.

B-4. By the end of the initial survey of the scene, searchers will have noted the obvious items of evidence to be collected. Decide in what order teams will process and collect them. If the scene is very large or if more than one person will be searching, decide what should be searched for and how the tasks and the area are to be divided. If the search extends beyond the immediate sensitive item scene, obtain manpower needed from a second unit.

B-5. Brief searchers thoroughly. Give them a full description of the evidence being sought. Tell them how the evidence may have been hidden or discarded. Tell them what to do when they find a piece of evidence. Tell them, emphatically, that when they find an item thought to be the one being sought, or one like it, they must take three actions:

- Refrain from touching or moving the item.

- Immediately tell the person in charge of the search.
- Protect the area until an investigator arrives.

B-6. A successful crime scene search produces a comprehensive and nondestructive accumulation of all available physical evidence within a reasonable period of time. It should minimize movement and avoid unneeded disturbance. Search a scene using one or more of four methods:

- Circle search.
- Strip search.
- Grid search.
- Zone or sector search.

Determine the method by the intent of the search and by the area to be covered. In rooms, buildings, and small outdoor areas, a systematic circle search is often used. In large outdoor areas a strip search, followed by a grid search, is more useful. After mentally dividing the area into strips about 4 feet wide, the searcher begins at one corner of the main area and moves back and forth from one side to the other, each trip being made within one strip. The grid search covers an area in the same way, but the searcher moves from end to end. Both indoor and outdoor areas may be searched using the zone or sector method.

PROCESSING AND COLLECTING SENSITIVE MATERIALS

B-7. As you begin your efforts to process evidence, remember that the evidence value of materials at the scene is not always easy to tell in the early stages of an investigation. If you have any doubt about whether or not to collect and preserve an item that might be evidence, do so.

B-8. Give first priority to fragile evidence that can be altered by time or the elements. Collecting evidence at a scene is usually done after the search has been completed and photographs have been taken. But under certain conditions it may be best to collect fragile items of evidence as they are found. Some forms of evidence can be destroyed by the elements or be contaminated, despite protective measures.

B-9. Next, collect items that could impede the search of scene—but only after they have been located, noted, photographed, and depicted on the sketch. The essential factor is that the evidence be carefully and properly collected.

B-10. Place your initials and the date and time of discovery on each piece of evidence, so you can identify it at a later date. Do this as soon as possible after you discover the evidence. Place the information where it is least likely to affect the appearance, monetary value, use, and evidence value of the item. Evidence that cannot be marked must be placed in a proper clean container; sealed; and identified by marks on the container. Make notes, to include a description, in your notebook at the time the evidence is marked. For specific guidance on sealing evidence, see AR 195-5.

B-11. Examine, photograph, sketch, record, and collect major evidence in the order that is most logical, considering the need to conserve movement. Do not move any item until it has been examined for trace evidence. Make casts and lift latent prints from items that must be moved. At least develop, photograph, and cover prints with tape before an item is moved. (See AR 195-5.)

B-12. You may have to damage, partially destroy, or otherwise decrease the effectiveness of an article to collect important evidence. Such actions are based on the needs of the individual case. You may have to cut the upholstery on a piece of furniture to get an area stained with blood. You might need to cut out a section of a wall to collect fingerprints or other evidence that cannot be collected by other means. A door or a window may need to be removed from a building to process it at a lab or to hold it as evidence. When a door or a window is removed or when a building or a room is made insecure by evidence collection actions, make sure that measures are taken to protect the interior's contents.

B-13. When death is involved, process the evidence between the point of entry to the scene and the body. Next, make a detailed search of the deceased. After the search, the body may be removed according to casualty disposition instructions. Then continue processing evidence.

B-14. After processing the major, obvious, evidence, search for and collect trace evidence. After the trace evidence has been processed, the scene should be dusted for latent prints. After these are lifted, explore the scene for trace evidence that was not observed during the visual search. Pieces of evidence found during the exploratory search should be noted, photographed, sketched, and collected. Then critical areas of the scene should be vacuumed if necessary, based on the physical properties related to the sensitive evidence. When vacuuming, surface areas should be segmented. Package the sweepings from each area separately. (Note: Vacuuming is appropriate for confined areas, such as a motor vehicle or room. It may not be appropriate for a large cave floor, for example.) Record the location of their point of recovery.

B-15. Make elimination prints of investigators and all other persons who may have access to the crime scene. Elimination prints allow the lab to eliminate the prints of all persons who had legal access to the scene. Usually, elimination fingerprints and physical evidence standards are collected after you complete the above actions.

HANDLING EVIDENCE

B-16. It is your responsibility to make sure that every precaution is taken to preserve evidence in its original state until its final disposition. The main scientific requirements for handling and preserving evidence are that the evidence be protected from change. Organic materials will always undergo some change. Inorganic materials may undergo change from the weather or other unavoidable actions. Handle the evidence as little as possible. Rubber gloves may be used. Use only clean containers to store and ship evidence. Clean containers reduce the chance for chemical and bacterial contamination of a sample. Use containers that prevent spillage, evaporation, and seepage. Take care not to accidentally scratch, bend, or unnecessarily touch evidence. Watch for cross-exchange, such as placing a suspect tool that will be examined for paint in contact with painted surfaces at the crime scene. If you touch a piece of evidence and leave your fingerprints on it, show this fact in your notes. Also, if lab personnel are to examine the evidence, be sure to inform them that your fingerprints are on it.

B-17. Preservation of evidence includes preserving the security of the evidence. It also includes preserving its chain of custody. Each person in the chain is responsible for the care, safekeeping, and preservation of the evidence under his control. Persons in a chain of custody are identified on the DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document), which is initiated when the evidence is acquired. This form, known as the custody document, is a multipurpose form. It is a receipt for acquiring evidence. It is a record of the chain of custody of evidence and authority for final disposition. And it cites the final disposition and/or witnessing of destruction of the evidence.

B-18. Evidence is stored in a key-type field safe or other high security container for temporary storage of evidence during other than normal duty hours. The evidence custodian is responsible for the evidence when you or other competent authority involved in the investigation, like a trial counsel, are not using it.

B-19. Evidence that you obtain must be tagged before it is submitted to the evidence custodian. Tagging should be done at the crime scene when the evidence is collected, at the place where it is received, or as soon as possible thereafter. Attach DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag) or its equivalent to each piece of evidence to identify and control it. When pieces of evidence are grouped together, like tools in a toolbox, and listed as one item on DA Form 4137, only one tag is used. When heat seal bags are used, the tags provided with the bags are used.

B-20. You must record each item of evidence that you acquire on a DA Form 4137. Prepare an original and three copies. Entries should be typed or printed legibly in ink. When evidence is received from a person, use the last copy in the form set as a receipt and provide it to the individual turning over the evidence. When evidence is found, rather than received from a person, give the last copy to the responsible military leader at the scene. The original and the first two copies go to the evidence custodian. He keeps the original and first copy for his records. The second copy is returned to you for inclusion in the case file.

B-21. Complete the administrative section of the custody document, stating clearly how the evidence was obtained. In the Description of Articles section, describe each item of evidence, accurately and in detail. Cite the model, serial number, condition, and any unusual marks or scratches. Enter the quantity of an item that is hard to measure or subject to change, like glass fragments or crushed tablets, using terms like “approximately 50,” or “undetermined,” or “Unknown.”

B-22. The Chain of Custody section provides information about the release and receipt of evidence. From initial acquisition of evidence to its final disposition, every change in custody must be recorded in this section. The first entry under the Released By column is the signature, name, and grade or title of the person from whom the property was taken. If the person refuses or is unable to sign, enter his name on the form and write “refused” or “unable to sign” in the signature block. If the evidence was found at the scene or if the owner cannot be determined, write NA in the signature block.

B-23. Under Purpose of Change of Custody column write, “evaluation of evidence.” If you are also the evidence custodian, write, “received by evidence

custodian." If the evidence you are listing is nonfungible evidence sealed in a container, note this information in this block as, "sealed in a [state the type of container]." (*Nonfungible evidence* is evidence readily identified, marked distinctively, or with individual characteristics (for example, items with serial numbers or anything that can be marked for identification by the person assuming custody [AR 195-5]). And whenever custody of sealed fungible evidence changes, note in this column, "sealed container received, contents not inventoried." This may be abbreviated as "SCRCNI." (*Fungible evidence* is evidence that might easily be exchanged or substituted for other like substances. It is not readily identified, marked distinctively, or possessed of individual characteristics [AR 195-5]).

B-24. If and when any change of custody occurs, it is the responsibility of the person in control of the evidence at that time to ensure that entries of the change are made on the original DA Form 4137 and all appropriate copies. The importance of keeping accurate and complete custody documents cannot be overemphasized.

B-25. When evidence is sent to the lab, the sender must ensure its security and chain of custody are not violated. A package wrapped for shipment to the laboratory should contain evidence from only one investigation. Each item of evidence within the shipping container should be in its own separate package. Violation of this procedure can result in contamination of evidence and problems in the chain of custody.

B-26. Complete DA Form 3655 (Crime Lab Examination Request) in an original and two copies. Instructions for completing this form are outlined in AR 195-5, chapter 2. Keep one copy of the form in the investigative case file. The original and the other copy of the form will go with the evidence to the laboratory. Your photographs and sketches are often very useful to the lab examiners, particularly in violent crimes. Consider including copies of them when you send evidence to the laboratory.

B-27. Pack each item in a way that will minimize friction and prevent the item from shifting, breaking, leaking, or contacting other evidence. Pack in cotton or soft paper items that are particularly susceptible to being broken, marred, or damaged.

B-28. Wrap each item of evidence separately. Label each item to correspond with its entry on DA Form 3655 and pack it securely in a shipping box. Documentary evidence may be placed in an envelope. Seal the box or envelope containing the evidence with tape or glue. Place your initials or signature across the sealed flap of the envelope or across the paper tape used to seal the box. Cover your initials or signature with transparent tape.

B-29. Place the original and one copy of DA Form 3655 and the original of DA Form 4137, obtained from the evidence custodian, in an envelope. Seal it, and address it to the laboratory with an attention line to the specific division (document, fingerprint, firearm). Tape this sealed envelope securely to the box or envelope containing the evidence. Then wrap the box in heavy paper or seal the envelope inside another envelope.

B-30. Label packages containing items of evidence that require careful or selective handling while in transit "corrosive," "fragile," "keep away from

fire," or "keep cool," as appropriate. And keep in mind that evidence that needs refrigeration can be damaged or destroyed if left unattended in a post office over a weekend.

B-31. The way you transmit evidence to the crime labs depends on the type of evidence and the urgency of need for the results. Evidence may be hand carried to the lab or sent by registered first class mail. Government carriers may also transport it. Federal laws prohibit transmitting certain types of merchandise through postal channels. If there is any question on mailing, consult the postal unit supporting the operations, or the nearest personnel services organization or staff.

Appendix C

Lessons Learned from Tunnel Operations

This appendix contains a historical example and lessons learned from it. It lists possible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) based on those lessons.

IMPORTANT NOTE: The use of riot control agents, such as CS, in tactical operations is <u>prohibited</u> by treaty today. Riot control agents may be used only with the permission of the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of dealing with civil disturbances. Other techniques discussed in this historical analysis should be applied in accordance with US laws and the ROE for the operation.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

C-1. The US Army has a long history of confronting combatants who prepared underground positions. The historical vignette that follows illustrates the challenges faced by a unit that uncovers an underground complex in the course of offensive operations. Operation CEDAR FALLS was a multidivision offensive controlled by III Corps, with brigades from the 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and supporting forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The intent of the operation was to eliminate the enemy from the infamous "Iron Triangle." By the time the 21-day operation ended, allied forces had destroyed 1,100 bunkers and 400 tunnels and underground complexes.

Exploiting and Destroying a Tunnel Complex during the Vietnam War, 1967

On 21 January a Viet Cong sympathizer was apprehended by the 168th Engineers and admitted having helped dig the underground complex. A patrol was organized from the staff sections of the 1st Engineer Battalion and was led by the sympathizer to the tunnel area where he pointed out several air holes and firing ports. Further examination of the area uncovered a base camp with several tunnel entrances.

The next day, after posting security forces, a thorough search of the tunnels was begun by engineer tunnel rats with initial negative results. Then a breather hole was blown open revealing the entrance to hundreds of meters of additional tunnel. About six hundred meters into the tunnel the engineers ran into an

accumulation of CS, and the exploration stopped. The many documents found in the complex were taken to the G-2 of the 1st Division; upon evaluation of the papers, the G-2 determined that the search of the tunnel complex should be continued.

Next day the engineer tunnel rats returned accompanied by their counterparts from the attached chemical platoon. After exploring an additional 800 meters of tunnel, they found and removed a trapdoor, disclosing additional chambers and documents. Over one kilometer of tunnel had now been uncovered. Further exploration revealed an exit leading to another enemy base camp.

The exploration continued the following day, and more documents were uncovered and evacuated. As the tunnel rats crawled through the complex, they heard enemy voices. A CS grenade thrown by the team flushed five Viet Cong from the tunnel; they were captured as they scrambled out. **[NOTE: Use of CS or other riot control agents in tactical operations is currently prohibited.]** Above ground, the security elements found a former hospital base camp complex 300 meters north of the camp discovered the previous day, and an investigation of tunnels of this complex was begun.

Early the next morning, the fourth day of exploration, the tunnel rats returned to the former hospital complex. Five huts were unearthed, each dug into the ground so that the roof was at ground level. Medical textbooks and notebooks, small quantities of medicine, and medical instruments were discovered in the 300 meters of rooms and chambers. The tunnel team returned to the second tunnel complex where the Viet Cong had been flushed, but CS in the tunnel prevented further exploration. Tunnel destruction personnel from the 168th Engineers arrived that afternoon and remained at the overnight position.

On 26 January, the day CEDAR FALLS terminated, the tunnel destruction team left for the former hospital complex and the exploration team returned to the “CS tunnel” complex. Using conventional demolitions and acetylene equipment, the team rigged the hospital complex for destruction after receiving word that no additional information had been found by those combing the underground labyrinth. The charges were detonated at noon; after the explosion, large cracks could be seen on the surface for a distance of approximately two hundred meters. The team then moved to the second tunnel complex and, again using a combination of conventional demolitions and acetylene, destroyed it.

Because of the numerous enemy underground complexes discovered, there were too many burrows for the few trained tunnel rats to explore. Volunteers from the 1st Engineers and other units often took on the task of exploration and destruction. As would be expected, the results when using trained, experienced, and properly equipped personnel were much more valuable—and far safer—than those gained through volunteers. Unless the tunnel was mapped as it was explored, the engineers who were to destroy the tunnel were required to go back in and map it, duplicating effort. There were also instances in which two teams were in a tunnel at the same time with neither team knowing of the other's presence. Luckily, no one was shot by mistake.

A new method of tunnel destruction was developed and used during CEDAR FALLS. It consisted of filling a tunnel with acetylene gas—forced in by blowers—then igniting the gas by demolition charges. Acetylene alone was found excellent for destroying tunnels with not more than seven feet of overhead cover. With

deeper tunnels destruction was increased through the use of conventional demolitions in conjunction with the acetylene. Thirty-pound charges of TNT and 40-pound cratering charges were placed at critical locations (rooms, tunnel junctions, exits, and entrances) in the complex. These charges were dual primed, connected in series by detonation cord, and fired electrically. When detonated, the conventional charges acted as booster charges for the acetylene. These experiments, using high explosives and acetylene together, proved very effective on tunnels as much as fifteen to twenty feet below the surface.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 1st Engineers and attached units discovered literally helicopter loads of documents, records, and plans, many of which belonged to the Viet Cong intelligence section of Military Region IV from 1963 through 1966. The documents listed the strengths of Viet Cong units, the names of their members, and the towns and villages in which they operated; disclosed some of their meeting places; and revealed a great amount of information on exactly how the enemy operated and what his future plans were. In addition to intelligence gathering and jungle destruction, 9,445 meters of enemy tunnels, 4 villages, 27 base camps, 60 miscellaneous bunkers, and other facilities were destroyed by the engineers.

Source: Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers, "Cedar Falls, 8-26 January 1967—Engineer and Chemical Operations," chap. 6 of *Cedar Falls—Junction City: A Turning Point*, Center for Military History Vietnam Studies (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, 1989) 67–70. Available online: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/90-7/cont.htm

DISCUSSION AND TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

C-2. The use of tunnels, caves and underground bunkers as hiding places, caches for food and weapons, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions, headquarters/command and control complexes, and protection against air strikes and artillery fire has been characteristic of the nature of the war in Afghanistan and other desert environments. Bunkers and extensive tunnel/cave systems containing conference, storage, and hiding rooms, as well as interconnected fighting points, have been frequently encountered. Additionally, they are an outstanding source of intelligence, as evidenced by the documents found during the clearing of tunnels/caves during recent operations.

PROBLEM AREAS

C-3. The first characteristic of a bunker/tunnel/cave complex is normally superb camouflage.

C-4. Entrances and exits are concealed, bunkers are camouflaged, and even within the tunnel/cave complex itself, side tunnels are concealed, hidden trapdoors are prevalent, and dead-end tunnels are used to confuse an attacker.

C-5. In many instances, the first indication of a tunnel/cave complex will be fire received from a concealed bunker, which might otherwise have gone undetected. Spoil from the tunnel system is normally distributed over a wide area.

C-6. Trapdoors may be used, both at entrances and exits, and inside the tunnel complex itself, concealing side tunnels and intermediate sections of a main tunnel. In many cases, a trapdoor will lead to a short change of direction or change of level tunnel/cave, followed by a second trapdoor, a second change of direction, and a third trapdoor opening again into the main tunnel/ cave. Trapdoors are of several types: They may be concrete covered by dirt, hard packed dirt reinforced by wire, or a "basin" type consisting of a frame filled with dirt. This latter type is particularly difficult to locate in that probing will not reveal the presence of the trapdoor unless the outer frame is actually struck by the probe. Trapdoors covering entrances/exits are generally a minimum of 100 meters apart. Booby traps may be used extensively, both inside and outside entrance/exit trapdoors.

C-7. Recognition of their cellular nature is important for understanding tunnel complexes. Prisoner interrogation has indicated that many tunnel complexes are interconnected, but the connecting tunnels, concealed by trapdoors or blocked by three to four feet of dirt, are known only to selected persons and are used only in emergencies. Indications also point to interconnections of some length, for example, 5 to 7 kilometers, through which relatively large bodies of men may be transferred from one area to another, especially from one "fighting" complex to another. The "fighting" complexes terminate in well-constructed bunkers, in many cases covering likely landing zones in a war zone or base area.

TUNNEL AND CAVE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

C-8. A trained tunnel/cave exploitation and denial team is essential to the expeditious and thorough exploitation and denial of enemy tunnels. Untrained personnel may miss hidden tunnel entrances and caches, take unnecessary casualties from concealed mines and booby traps, and may not adequately deny the tunnel to future enemy use.

C-9. Each unit should designate tunnel/cave teams. Tunnel/cave teams should be trained, equipped, and maintained in a ready status to provide immediate expert assistance when tunnels are discovered.

C-10. Careful mapping of a tunnel/cave complex may reveal other hidden entrances as well as the location of adjacent tunnel complexes and underground defensive systems.

C-11. Small caliber pistols or pistols with silencers are the weapons of choice in tunnels/caves, since large caliber weapons without silencers may collapse sections of the tunnel/cave when fired and damage eardrums.

C-12. Personnel exploring large tunnel/cave complexes should carry a colored smoke grenade to mark the location of additional entrances as they are found. In mountainous desert areas it is often difficult to locate the position of these entrances without smoke.

C-13. Two- and three-man teams should enter tunnels/caves for mutual support.

C-14. Claustrophobia and panic could well cause the failure of the team's mission or the death of its members.

C-15. Constant communication between the tunnel/cave and the surface is essential to facilitate tunnel/cave mapping and exploitation.

TUNNEL/CAVE EXPLOITATION AND DESTRUCTION

C-16. The area in the immediate vicinity of the bunker or tunnels/caves is secured and defended by a 360-degree perimeter to protect the clearing team.

C-17. The entrance to the tunnel is carefully examined for mines and booby traps.

C-18. Two members of the team enter the tunnel with wire communications to the surface.

C-19. The team works its way through the tunnel, probing with bayonets for booby traps and mines and looking for hidden entrances, food and arms caches, water locks, and air vents. As the team moves through the tunnel, compass headings and distances traversed are called to the surface. A team member at the surface maps the tunnel as exploitation progresses.

Representative Tunnel Team Equipment List (Vietnam, 1965)

- Protective Mask—one per individual
- TA-1 telephone —two each
- One-half mile field wire on doughnut roll
- Compass—two each
- Sealed beam 12-volt flashlight—two each
- Small caliber pistol—two each
- Probing rods—12 inches and 36 inches
- Bayonet—two each
- Portable blower—one each
- M7A2 CS grenades—twelve each **[NOTE: Use of CS or other riot control agents in tactical operations is currently prohibited.]**
- Powdered CS-1—as required
- Colored smoke grenades—four each
- Insect repellant and spray—four cans
- Entrenching tool—two each
- Cargo packs on pack board—three each

C-20. Captured arms and intelligence documents are secured and retrieved for destruction or analysis.

C-21. Upon completion of exploitation, cratering charges or other available explosives are placed at all known tunnel entrances to seal each and prevent reuse by the enemy.

C-22. Tunnels are frequently outstanding sources of intelligence and should be exploited to the maximum extent practical before demolition.

C-23. Since tunnel complexes are carefully concealed and camouflaged, search and destroy operations must provide adequate time for a thorough search of the area to locate all tunnels. Complete exploitation and destruction of tunnel complexes is very time-consuming, and operational plans must be made accordingly to ensure success. The presence of a tunnel complex within or near an area of operations poses a continuing threat to all personnel in the area. No area containing tunnel complexes should ever be considered completely cleared.

Appendix D

Excerpts from Department of Defense Study Concerning Suspected Iraqi Chemical Warfare Storage Sites

This appendix contains excerpts from the final report on the An Nasiriya Southwest Ammunition Storage Point and a UN inspection team report about Iraqi chemical and biological sites. Both contain useful information on the most recent encounters by US forces with enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sites.

SECTION I – FINAL REPORT ON THE AN NASIRIYA SOUTHWEST AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT

D-1. The following discussion is taken from the DOD web site on Gulf War illnesses. While the purpose of the site is to provide clarification of possible exposure to chemical weapons, the site provides useful information on the most recent encounters by US forces with enemy CBRN sites. Only a part of one report is includes here. The complete report concerning this and other locations should be viewed at http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/. In addition to summaries and lessons learned, these reports provide detailed narratives about unit actions at the site. Most of the case studies include photographs taken at the sites.

An Nasiriyah Southwest - Ammunition Storage Point
Final Report
September 26, 2000

"Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans' concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate those incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996."

"Case Narratives are reports of what we know today about specific events that took place during the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991. This particular case narrative focuses on the An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point and whether chemical warfare agents, chemical weapons, or biological weapons were stored there during Desert Storm and the post-war US occupation. We published the initial narrative on July 30, 1998, and an updated version on January 10, 2000. Since that time, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that we amend the report and republish it as final after incorporating additional information from the 67th Explosive Ordnance Detachment concerning the identification of a suspected chemical munition. This version of the narrative responds to the Board's request, so this is a final report.

However, if you believe you have information which may change this case narrative, please contact my office by calling: **1-800-497-6261**"

Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
US Department of Defense
2000172-0000001 Ver. 2.1

SUMMARY

This investigation concerns the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, chemical weapons, and biological weapons at Iraq's An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point during and immediately after the Gulf War. The proximity of this ammunition storage point to Tallil Air Base and the fact that many of the same units conducted similar operations at both installations make this investigation a continuation of the Tallil investigation, which we published on November 13, 1997, and updated on May 22, 2000

This munitions storage facility, located south of the city of An Nasiriyah and the Euphrates River, consisted of two separately fenced storage areas. The western storage area, which stored primarily army ammunition, contained over 100 concrete storage bunkers, storage buildings, and open storage revetments. The eastern storage area, which primarily stored air force munitions, contained a smaller number of similar storage bunkers, buildings, and open revetments. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, this installation was a major Iraqi ammunition depot. During 1990-1991, the US intelligence community suspected this ammunition storage point contained chemical or biological weapon munitions. By the beginning of the Gulf War, the intelligence community had associated certain types of Iraq's ammunition storage bunkers, including what analysts dubbed "S-shaped" and "12-frame" bunkers, with chemical and biological weapons storage. The An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point had one S-shaped bunker and four 12-frame, refrigerated bunkers. All five of these bunkers were struck by air-delivered ordnance and by February 3, 1991, had been either heavily damaged or destroyed. During the post-war US occupation and demolition, no chemical or biological weapons were found at this facility, nor was any agent contamination detected in the ammunition storage area. An analysis of post-war information, including information from inspections by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, indicates that during Desert Storm Iraq stored chemical and biological weapons in more places than the S-shaped and 12-frame bunkers, including in the open where the weapons were less likely to be damaged by Coalition bombing. Today, the US intelligence community believes many of its pre-war assessments of suspected chemical and biological weapon bunkers were inaccurate and that Iraq probably did not use the five S-shaped and 12-frame bunkers at An Nasiriyah Southwest to store chemical or biological weapons during Desert Storm.

In 1996, in accordance with United Nations Resolution 687, Iraq declared that it had stored in a bunker at An Nasiriyah Southwest, from approximately January 15 to February 15, 1991, more than 6,000 155mm mustard-filled artillery rounds, which in 1991 it had showed to United Nations inspectors in an open area 5 kilometers to the west of the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point. Iraq claims these munitions were moved to prevent destruction by Coalition air strikes. To date, the United Nations Special commission's inspections, interviews, and other research support this declaration. These 155mm mustard rounds are the only chemical weapons likely to have been stored at the An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point during the air campaign. Bunker 8, which Iraq declared had held the munitions, was not one of the five bunkers suspected of chemical or biological weapons storage and was not targeted or damaged by Coalition bombing. US ground forces, including explosive ordnance disposal personnel and chemical warfare agent specialists, searched the ASP and destroyed bunkers, buildings, and munitions before US troops withdrew. The search revealed no chemical or biological weapons.

In March 1991, while identifying munitions and fragments near this storage point, explosive ordnance disposal personnel located a damaged munition with some chemical weapon characteristics. They immediately departed the area and reported the sighting to higher headquarters. A Fox nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicle checked the munition and the surrounding area for the presence of chemical agents and

found no evidence of chemical warfare agents. The senior 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment member present at the scene provided photos of this damaged munition to the investigation.

After the war the 9th Chemical Detachment participated in a biological weapons sampling mission at the An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point. Four of the veterans interviewed for this investigation were Black Hawk helicopter crewmembers who supported this sampling mission on March 6, 1991. The Black Hawk crew chief observed artillery shells leaking unidentified material and recalled that the sampling team members burned their chemical protective suits at the completion of the mission. This led the crew chief to believe the crew may have been exposed to chemical warfare agents. Interviews with three of the biological warfare agent sampling team members indicate they tested for chemical warfare agents with M256 kits and collected soil samples for laboratory analysis. The sampling team collected five samples: melted liquid from an artillery shell, liquid from a different artillery shell, and three soil samples from two different bunker sites in the ammunition storage point. These samples tested negative for biological-weapons-associated substances, and the team did not report any positive M256 kit detections. The 513th Military Intelligence Brigade chemical officer, who led this sampling team, said that the aircrew asked them to burn their chemical protective gear before departure to avoid any potential contamination of the helicopter.

Interviews with explosive ordnance disposal experts, chemical weapon technicians, and engineers involved in demolition operations at the An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point failed to uncover evidence of the presence of either chemical or biological-filled weapons. For five weeks from March 2 to April 7, 1991, US troops conducted demolition operations at this installation without wearing chemical protective gear, yet no one reported or sought medical attention for symptoms of blister or nerve agent exposure.

Based on these interviews; the results of the United Nations Special Commission inspections of this facility; all of Iraq's Chemical Full, Final, and Complete Disclosures; and a review of theater operational reports and national intelligence reporting, it is likely chemical weapons were present during Desert Shield before the US occupation, but unlikely chemical weapons, biological weapons, or bulk chemical agents were present in this complex during the US occupation. Given the inspections by the US and United Nations and the results of the sampling conducted by US personnel, the release of chemical warfare agents due to Coalition bombing also is unlikely.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

A. Chemical Warfare Agent Detection

During the Gulf War, two primary methodologies existed for detecting chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. One was visual—munitions markings, like painted bands or symbols, or physical characteristics like thin, double-walled casings; burster tubes; welded construction; fill plugs; etc. However, these visual characteristics are not always reliable. Chemical detectors were the second available method. Unfortunately, a properly designed, manufactured, and filled chemical munition will often not emit enough chemical warfare agent vapor to be reliably detected by current M256 kits or CAMs. This presented explosive ordnance disposal technicians with the very impractical and dangerous task of having to disassemble an unknown munition in order to positively identify if it is filled with a hazardous agent. The technology now exists to reliably detect munitions contents by external sensors and should be fielded as soon as possible.

B. Policies and Procedures for Munition Destruction

Under normal non-combat conditions, explosive ordnance disposal technicians will carefully identify each munition to be destroyed, and implement a plan that, with a high degree of safety and reliability, would render each munition inert. Due to the large quantities of munitions captured during Desert Storm, and the limited amount of time, explosives, and EOD technicians available, this was not done. Entire bunkers full of munitions

were rigged for destruction without conducting a complete item-by-item inventory, and much of the demolition rigging was done by non-trained personnel—primarily combat engineers. Due to limited demolition materials, many of the munitions in these bunkers were either ejected intact or cooked off over an extended period of time. These ejections and cook offs placed US personnel at increased risk. Policies or directives should be developed that clearly communicate these risks to commanders, and provide explicit guidance on when and how non-EOD personnel will be used to destroy large quantities of captured munitions.

C. Mission Coordination and Communications

Operational units responsible for demolition, including explosive ordnance disposal and combat engineers, were not properly provided information necessary for the safe conduct of their mission. The US intelligence community had information on potential chemical and biological weapon storage sites that was not passed to the operators who occupied and destroyed them. Neither EOD nor the combat engineers who assisted them were briefed on the analytical association of S-shaped or 12-frame bunkers with chemical or biological weapons. Had this association been passed down to the operational level, these specific bunkers, and a significant area around them, would have certainly received additional attention from chemical and EOD specialists. Additionally, a special biological weapons sampling mission was flown to this installation without coordination with the operators who occupied it and were conducting demolition operations there, endangering everyone on this mission. The US Army aviation community carefully coordinates and de-conflicts operations in artillery firing zones; this same level of planning and coordination should be developed when EOD conducts demolition operations.

D. Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, and Training

The biological warfare agent sampling mission was conducted on short notice with very little coordination among the aircrew and the sampling team, and without following existing doctrine. The aircrew was not completely briefed on the nature of the mission, the potential hazards (like the demolition), and the safety precautions necessary to prevent possible chemical or biological warfare agent contamination. The sampling crew did not insure that all team members knew the mission objective, their specific roles, and the tasks assigned to the other members. The lack of internal communications created a situation where one of the team members did not know he was inspecting a suspected biological weapons storage site until after the mission and an aircrew member thought the burning of MOPP gear was an unusual event rather than a prudent, conservative, safety precaution. The team members' ignorance regarding the big picture led to erroneous speculation and unnecessary concern. A thorough pre-mission brief with both the helicopter crew and the sampling teams in future chemical or biological sampling surveys would further enhance mission safety and effectiveness, and reduce misunderstandings.

E. Feedback

The team members did not understand the sample testing procedures or the notification process for positive results (and lack of notification for negative results). Communication between the unit taking the samples and the laboratory where the samples are analyzed is critical. The chemical officer of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade received no results of the laboratory tests conducted in the United States. There are many reasons that could have prevented this feedback, but the lack of a procedure to communicate both positive and negative test results for chemical warfare agent caused unnecessary concerns and post-war speculation. Implementation of a simple procedure could increase the opportunity for feedback.

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SECTION II – UN INSPECTION TEAM REPORT ABOUT IRAQI CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SITES.

D-2. The following is the text of UN Inspection Team Report about Iraqi Chemical and Biological sites. These sites were visited after the Gulf War in 1996. For the original on-line version of the report, see http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19970613/970613_60210196_96_txt_0001.html

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
COUNTRY: IRAQ (IZ).

SUBJECT: IIR 6 021 0196 96/IRAQI FALLUJAH, KHAMISIYAH,
AND AN-NASIRIYAH CHEMICAL WARFARE RELATED SITES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 960520

SUMMARY: FROM 960511 TO 960520,UNSCOM ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION SUPPORT TEAM INSPECTED THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE RELATED FACILITIES, FALLUJAH THREE, AND THE KHAMISIYAH (TALL AL-LAHM) AND AN-NASIRIYAH MUNITIONS STORAGE AREAS.

TEXT: 1. FROM 960511 TO 960520,UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM) ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION SUPPORT TEAM-NINE B (OST-9B) INSPECTED THE FOLLOWING IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) RELATED FACILITIES--FALLUJAH THREE CASTOR OIL EXTRACTION FACILITY//GEOCOORD: 333288N0433694E//, THE KHAMISIYAH (TALL AL-LAHM) AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA//GEOCOORD: 3047N04626E//, AND THE AN-NASIRIYAH STORAGE DEPOT//GEOCOORD: 3057N04306E//.

3. KHAMISIYAH (TALL AL-LAHM)AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA. OST-9B INSPECTED THE AREA INSIDE AND AROUND BUNKER 73. THIS STRUCTURE WAS TOTALLY DESTROYED, BUT THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF SAKR-18, 122MM CHEMICAL ROCKETS BOTH IN THE PREVIOUS FOOTPRINT OF THE STRUCTURE, AS WELL AS THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE INSPECTION TEAM TOOK A NUMBER OF STILL AND VIDEO PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE AREA AND THE ROCKETS, CONCENTRATING ON FEATURES WHICH ARE SPECIFIC TO CW FILLED ROCKETS (I.E. CENTRAL BURSTER, PLASTIC CANISTERS, ETC.). DISCUSSIONBETWEEN THE INSPECTION TEAM AND THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES REVEALED THE FOLLOWING--

3A. IRAQ MOVED 2,160 SAKR-18 GB/GF FILLED ROCKETS (TWO CANISTERS-GA/GF) BETWEEN 910110 TO 910115 FROM AL-MUTHANNA STATE ESTABLISHMENT//GEOCOORD: 335031N0435051E// TO BUNKER 73. (FIELD COMMENT--GA IS TABUN, GB IS SARIN, AND GF IS CYCLOHEXYL SARIN.)

3B. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, THE ROCKETS BEGAN TO LEAK AND THE IRAQIS BEGAN TO MANUALLY MOVE THE ROCKETS (FOUR MEN PER ROCKET) TO A SITE, IN THE OPEN, NEAR THE CANAL, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETERS FROM BUNKER 73. BY THE TIME

OF THE IRAQI RETREAT IN LATE 910200 AND EARLY 910300, APPROXIMATELY 1,100 ROCKETS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE SITE. BOTH BUNKER 73 AND THE ROCKETS THAT WERE STORED IN THE OPEN WERE INTACT AT THE TIME OF THE IRAQI RETREAT.

3C. UPON RETURNING TO THE SITE, AFTER OCCUPATION FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN, THE IRAQIS DISCOVERED THAT BUNKER 73 HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF WIRE AND OTHER EVIDENCE OF GROUND DESTRUCTION PRESENT. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS THE SAME TYPE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FACT THAT SOME OF THE ROCKETS LOCATED IN THE OPEN AREA HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY THE OCCUPYING FORCES.

3D. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDED UNSCOM 29'S DESTRUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 700 OF THE REMAINING ROCKETS LOCATED IN THE OPEN AREA, AS WELL AS THE IRAQI BACKFILL OF THE BUNKER 73 AREA WITH SOIL.(FIELD COMMENT--UNSCOM 29/CD1 CONDUCTED ITS CW DESTRUCTION MISSION FROM 920228 TO 920324.)

3E. IN ADDITION TO THE BUNKER 73 AREA, THE INSPECTION TEAM ALSO EXAMINED THE `CANAL BANK' AREA, USED BY THE IRAQIS FOR OPEN STORAGE, AND FOUND EVIDENCE OF SAKR-18'S//GEOCOORD: 304454.1N0462587.1E//. THE INSPECTION TEAM EXAMINED THE REMAINS OF THE TWO MOST SOUTHERN BUNKERS OF EACH OF THE SOUTHERNMOST ROWS (NEAREST THE NEW CANAL, INCLUDING BUNKER 73) FOR THE PRESENCE OF CW OR SUSPECT CW MUNITIONS. THIS WAS DONE TO VERIFY THE IRAQI CLAIM THAT NO OTHER CW MUNITIONS WERE PRESENT AT KHAMISIYAH. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FURTHER CW MUNITIONS. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, SOME EVIDENCE OF SOME INTERESTING `BASE EJECT', 155MM PROJECTILES WHICH WERE EMPTY.

3F. IN SUMMARY, BASED ON PHYSICAL EXAMINATION, AS WELL AS DISCUSSION WITH IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES, IT APPEARED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 2,160 GB/GF FILLED 122MM SAKR-18 CW ROCKETS AT KHAMISIYAH AT THE TIME OF THE GULF WAR. FURTHER, THERE IS NO REASON TO DISBELIEVE THE IRAQIS WITH RESPECT TO CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE ROCKETS.

4. AN-NASIRIYAH STORAGE DEPOT. THE PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTION OF AN-NASIRIYAH WAS TO DOCUMENT EVENTS SURROUNDING THE RECEIPT, STORAGE, AND REMOVAL OF APPROXIMATELY 6,000 155MM IRAQI HD MUNITIONS MOVED TO AN-NASIRIYAH IN THE MID 910100 TIME-FRAME. THE INSPECTION TEAM OBSERVED THAT 12 TO 14 BUNKERS WERE IN USE AT THIS SITE, 22 HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY COALITION BOMBING, AND OVER 20 HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY OCCUPATION FORCES.

4B. THE INSPECTION TEAM'S DISCUSSION WITH THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES CENTERED AROUND THE DELIVERY, STORAGE, AND MOVEMENT OF HD MUNITIONS FROM AL-MUTHANNA TO THIS SITE IN 910100, SPECIFICALLY THE FOLLOWING--
-APPROXIMATELY 6,000 MUNITIONS WERE MOVED FROM AL-MUTHANNA TO AN-NASIRIYAH BETWEEN 910110 AND 910115.
-THE MUNITIONS WERE PLACED IN IRAQI BUNKER NUMBER EIGHT//GEOCOORD: 305815.9N0461015.3E//.
-ALSO IN BUNKER EIGHT THERE WERE A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF 120MM HE MORTAR ROUNDS AND 7.9MM BALL SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION.
-THE MUNITIONS WERE REMOVED FROM BUNKER EIGHT AND AN-NASIRIYAH OVER A ONE-WEEK PERIOD AROUND 910215 AND PLACED IN THE OPEN AREA NEAR KHAMISIYAH (TAL AL-LAHM)//GEOCOORD: 304605.3N0462276.1E//. THE INSPECTION TEAM EXAMINED THIS SITE AND DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINING MUNITIONS OF ANY TYPE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A RECENTLY CONSTRUCTED CANAL ADJACENT TO THE DUMP SITE.

4C. THE INSPECTION TEAM EXAMINED ADDITIONAL BUNKERS IN ORDER TO CLARIFY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AN-NASIRIYAH SITE, SPECIFICALLY THE FOLLOWING--- IRAQI BUNKER NUMBERS 15//GEOCOORD: 305773.0N0461015.5E// AND 19 (UNSCOM NUMBERS 99 AND 98 RESPECTIVELY). THE INSPECTION TEAM DID NOT OBTAIN GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES FOR BUNKER 19, DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. THESE TWO BUNKERS WERE TYPICAL IN THEIR CONSTRUCTION AND CONTENT, SUCH AS MIXED PROJECTILES, MORTAR ROUNDS, SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, AND PROPELLANT. HOWEVER, THESE TWO STRUCTURES WERE DESTROYED AT 0100 HOURS, 910117, BY COALITION BOMBING. IN ALL APPROXIMATELY 22 STRUCTURES WERE DESTROYED BY AERIAL BOMBING. BUNKER EIGHT WAS DESTROYED BY OCCUPATION FORCES, AS EVIDENCED BY U.S. DETONATORS, ETC., LEFT IN PLACE. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS AT THESE SITES.

4D. IRAQI BUNKERS 59//GEOCOORD: 305787.7N0460917.0E//, 60//GEOCOORD: 305780.2N0460923.0E//, AND 61//GEOCOORD: 305771.0N0460922.0E// (UNSCOM NUMBERS 101 TO 103). THESE BUNKERS WERE ALL DESTROYED BY COALITION AERIAL BOMBING. THEY WERE BUILT AND USED FOR STORAGE OF SENSITIVE EXPLOSIVES, I.E. DETONATION CHARGES, DETONATORS, TNT, ETC. AS SUCH, THEY WERE EQUIPPED WITH `CHILLERS', WHICH PROVIDED COOLED AIR TO THE INTERIOR OF THE BUNKERS' FOUR SEPARATE STORAGE ROOMS. THE INSPECTION TEAM EXAMINED ALL OF THESE BUNKERS AND DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE OF ANYTHING OTHER THAN THOSE TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES PREVIOUSLY INDICATED AS BEING STORED THERE.

4E. IRAQI BUNKER 20//GEOCOORD: 305747.7N0461047.8E// (UNSCOM NUMBER 71). THIS BUNKER WAS TYPICAL OF THE TYPE REMAINING IN USE. THE DOORS TO THE STRUCTURE WERE LOCKED, HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS READILY AGREED TO ALLOW ACCESS. THE CONTENTS OF THE BUNKER WERE AS FOLLOWS--
-120MM MORTAR ROUNDS
-130MM PROJECTILES
-155MM HE (U.S. 820000)
-FUSES
-PROPELLANT
-SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

THE PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUNKER WAS ESSENTIALLY A MAIN ROOM SURROUNDED BY AN ANNULUS WITH TWIN ANTEROOMS OFF THE ENTRANCE. 155MM AND 12MM SHELLS WERE STACKED IN THE ANTEROOMS. (FIELD COMMENT--THE CHIEF INSPECTOR STATED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO `RHYME OR REASON' TO IRAQI STORAGE PROCEDURES.)

4F. IRAQI BUILDING THREE//GEOCOORD: 305745.5N0460940.0E//. THIS STRUCTURE WAS ONE OF THREE SUCH STRUCTURES LOCATED AT THE AN-NASIRIYAH SITE. ESSENTIALLY THESE FACILITIES WERE CONSTRUCTED OF BRICK AND CORRUGATED TIN, AND BUILT AT-GRADE. THE DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THESE FACILITIES WAS EXPLAINED AS OCCURRING FROM THE BLAST WAVE FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF ADJACENT STRUCTURES. AN EXAMINATION OF BUILDING THREE REVEALED THE FOLLOWING CONTENTS--
-240MM CHINESE MORTAR ROUNDS
-122MM HE ROCKETS (JORDANIAN)
-155MM HIGH EXPLOSIVE ANTI-TANK, TNT, AND CYCLOTRIMETHYLENE NITRAMINE (RDX) OF U.S. MANUFACTURE
-ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADE LAUNCHERS (RPG)
-LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS OF RUSSIAN MANUFACTURE

-SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
-TOW OF U.S. MANUFACTURE
-AT-3 SAGGER ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE OF RUSSIAN MANUFACTURE
-120MM TANK AMMUNITION OF U.S. MANUFACTURE

4G. IN SUMMARY, THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY CW MUNITIONS STORED AT THIS SITE. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, EITHER PHYSICAL OR AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES, THAT THERE WERE CW MUNITIONS STORED HERE IN ADDITION TO THOSE 6,000 HD MUNITIONS INDICATED ABOVE.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF THE LOCATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF CW MUNITIONS AND IS A DIRECT EXCERPT FROM IRAQ'S MOST RECENT CHEMICAL FULL, FINAL, AND COMPLETE DISCLOSURE (FFCD), PRESENTED TO UNSCOM ON 960513-

-STATUS OF MUNITIONS FILLED WITH MUSTARD AND LOCATION-
- -

STORAGE SITE	QUANTITY	TYPE OF MUNITIONS
AL-MUHAMMADIYAT	200	AERIAL BOMB 250
SADDAM BASE	315	AERIAL BOMB 250
SADDAM BASE	90	AERIAL BOMB 500
AL-BAKR BASE	25	AERIAL BOMB 250
AL-BAKR BASE	135	AERIAL BOMB 500
AL-KADISIYA BASE	135	AERIAL BOMB 250
AL-KADISIYA BASE	315	AERIAL BOMB 500
AL-TUZ	225	AERIAL BOMB 250
AL-TUZ	135	AERIAL BOMB 500
TAMOZ BASE	200	AERIAL BOMB 250
AL-NASIRIYA STORES (AL-KAIMISIYA)	6,240	ARTILLERY SHELL 155MM
AL-AUKHADER STORES (THEN TRANSFERRED TO CHEMICAL PROVING GROUND)	6,394	ARTILLERY SHELL 155MM

-STATUS OF R-400 FILLED WITH IRAQI BINARY AND LOCATION--

STORAGE SITE	QUANTITY
AL-WALEED AIR BASE	176
SADDAM AIR BASE	80
AL-KADISIYA AIR BASE	240
SAAD AIR BASE	28
TAMOZ AIR BASE	120
TALHA AIRSTRIP	60
MURSANA AIRSTRIP	160
AL-TABAAT AIRSTRIP	160

-STATUS OF DISTRIBUTION OF OTHER MUNITIONS--

STORAGE SITE	QUANTITY	TYPE OF MUNITIONS
AIRSTRIP-37 (TAMOOZ AIR BASE)	125	AERIAL BOMB/250 FILLED CS
AL-MUHAMMADIYAT	12	AERIAL BOMB/DB-2 FILLED WITH

			SARIN
AL-MAYMONA MUNITIONS (STORE)		4,100	ROCKET 122MM FILLED WITH SARIN
AL-AUKHADER MUNITIONS (STORE)		2,160	ROCKET 122MM FILLED WITH SARIN
AL-KAMISIYA	2,160		ROCKET 122MM FILLED WITH SARIN
DUJALA AWARA		30	AL-HUSSEIN WARHEADS, 16 FILLED WITH SARIN, 14 FILLED WITH ALCOHOL
AL-NEBAIE		20	AL-HUSSEIN WARHEADS, FILLED WITH ALCOHOL

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//COMSOBJ: (U) b.2.

Appendix E

Information Operations Support

GENERAL

E-1. Once a sensitive site has been isolated, the greatest obstacle to seizing and securing the site are the enemy soldiers (the human factor) charged to guard and protect the site, and possibly the personnel who operate the site. The difficulty of overcoming the human obstacle and the method used will depend on many things. The morale and dedication of solders and their leadership will affect their determination to fight. Site considerations, such as the risk of releasing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material, may limit the weapons that can be used. Time is another consideration, as are the possible consequences of delaying seizure. A delay could create danger for friendly forces by allowing WMD to be employed or allowing time for evidence to be destroyed.

E-2. Information operations (IO) should be included in contingency plans and SOPs. Some points to be considered are—

- Conditions (risk assessment matrix) that determine when IO is required.
- Staff elements that will form the IO cell. (See FM 3-13.)
- IO augmentation is required.
- Location of IO assets (organic, assigned and attached units with IO capabilities) and resources (IO capabilities not under the control of the command but available to higher headquarters) and how to obtain and use them.
- Developing an IO battle drill matrix that identifies how each IO element will support seizing sensitive sites for a given risk/COA. (See sample matrix below)

E-3. *Offensive IO* is the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives (FM 3-0). Affecting decisions and decision makers takes time. If time is available, the maneuver force should request IO support from higher headquarters. There may be times when IO offer a more suitable and less risky course of action than employing maneuver and fires against a sensitive site. At such times, IO might be the decisive operation or an important shaping operation.

E-4. *Defensive IO* is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes (FM 3-0). Defensive IO should be

integrated into unit standing operating procedures and continuously assessed against the threat posed by enemy information warfare.

PLANNING

E-5. IO planning, coordination and synchronization ensure that all available lethal fire support and nonlethal effects are employed in accordance with the commander's intent and the concept of operations. The key to effective integration of IO is thorough consideration of the capabilities and limitations of the unit throughout the operations process.

E-6. IO staff officers, normally found at division and higher, will lead the IO planning and integration effort. A typical IO cell may contain any or all of the functions show in Figure E-1. For brigade and below, IO planning and integration can be accomplished through the S3, using guidance and available augmentation from higher headquarters. In some cases augmentation may be required.



Figure E-1. Example Information Operations Cell

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ASSETS

E-7. Consider the following IO elements and resources during IO planning:

- Counterintelligence.
- Counterreconnaissance.
- Smoke operations.
- Intelligence and electronic warfare.
  - TRAFFIC JAM.

  - UAV-SR.
  - GSR.
  - REMBASS.
  - Military intelligence interrogation teams.
  - Q36 and Q37 field artillery counterfire radars.
- Military deception.
- Psychological operations.
- Operations security.
- Maneuver, combat support and, combat service support units to create feints, demonstrations, or ruses.
- Civil-military operations.
  - Civil affairs battalion (division level).
  - Civil affairs brigade support team (brigade or battalion level).
  - Civil affairs tactical support team (battalion level).
- Physical destruction.
  - Organic and supporting direct and indirect fire weapons.
  - Engineer demolition teams.
- Public Affairs.
  - Organic public affairs section (division level).
  - Public Affairs Detachment (division and brigade level).

Example Information Operations Against a CBRN storage site

Condition. Sensitive Site is CBRN storage. The risk to intentional and accidental release of deadly materiel caused by fire and maneuver operations to physically secure the site is considered HIGH.

Desired outcome. Physically isolate the sensitive site with ground forces and use IO to isolate the enemy forces from outside information and to influence decision makers and soldiers to give up the site without a fight.

Actions:

- Request IO team from higher to support the planning, coordination, and application of IO elements.
- Use EW and physical destruction to exploit and disrupt communication or contact between the sensitive site and its next higher command or other influencing agency.
- Use PSYOP to influence the sensitive site security force to capitulate without a fight.
- Use CA and PSYOP to inform/warn/gain support from the local population. Use IO resources to inform/warn the occupants of the sensitive site and the local population as to the immediate dangers imposed by the site and what actions should be taken to mitigate the danger.
- Use PA to inform, quell rumors, and counter misinformation and enemy propaganda.

Example Information Operations Effects at War Crime Sensitive Site

Condition. A war crimes site has been identified. The risk of civil unrest/ disturbance is high if rumors, misinformation, and propaganda are not countered.

Desired outcome. Use ground forces to physically isolate the site to preserve evidence and prevent civil disturbance.

Actions:

- Use OPSEC to prevent unauthorized release of sensitive information.
- Use PA & CA to get the message out to the local population that ensures our intent to secure the site and allow international law activities to conduct an impartial investigation.

Example Information Operations Battle Drill—War Crime Sensitive Site

Condition. War crimes sensitive site has been identified. Adversaries are using rumors, misinformation, and propaganda to create civil unrest/disturbance concerning friendly forces handling of the site.

Actions. Use ground forces to physically isolate the site to preserve evidence and use IO to prevent civil disturbances.

IO Element	Task	Purpose	Target Audience
OPSEC	Prevent unauthorized release of information	Prevent misinformation that could be used to create civil unrest	Overt and covert information seekers
	OPSEC survey	Identify critical information and unauthorized collection sources	Unauthorized information seekers
CA	Engage local leaders	Mediate and convey that our intent is to support justice through international law	Ethnic leaders
PSYOP	Support CA and PA with communication resources	Convey our message to local population	Local population
PA	Truth projection	Counter propaganda and misinformation	Local and international media
Maneuver	Physical security of the site	Prevent unauthorized access, looting, or destruction of evidence	All unauthorized personnel

Desired End state: Site security is preserved for international investigation and civil disturbance is avoided.

Example Information Operations Battle Drill—CBRN Sensitive Site			
Condition. Sensitive site is CBRN storage. The risk of intentional or accidental release of deadly material caused by maneuver and fires to physically secure the site is considered HIGH.			
Actions. Request IO team from higher to support the planning, coordination, and application of IO elements. Request resources.			
IO Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
EW	Deny communication, C2, and information to site security force	To prevent enemy command from directing adverse reactions to loss of a sensitive site	Enemy sensitive site security force and their C2 structure
Physical Destruction	Destroy site hard-wire communications to outside	To prevent enemy command from directing adverse reactions to loss of a sensitive site	Communications infrastructure
Civil Affairs	Engage local leaders	Gain information; warn local population of potential danger.	Political leaders Civil leaders
Public Affairs	Use available media to get information to the public	Inform populace of factual information concerning the potential danger of the site and what they should do to help prevent a disaster	Local populace
CNO Request	Exploit enemy use of automation	Exploit enemy system vulnerabilities	All automation concerned with sensitive site operations
Maneuver Force	Isolate sensitive site from outside contact	Prevent physical contact with outside command and influences	Site security force
PSYOP	Influence enemy site security force to give up the site without damage	Eliminate enemy force resistance to prevent intentional or unintentional release of hazardous material	Site security force
Desired outcome. Physically isolate the sensitive site with ground forces and use IO to isolate the enemy forces from outside information and to influence decision makers and soldiers to give up the site without a fight.			

Glossary

ADA	air defense artillery
AO	area of operations
ARFOR	the senior army headquarters and all army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command
ART	Army tactical task (as used in the AUTL and UJTL)
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
AUTL	Army Universal Task List
BDO	battle dress overgarments
BIDS	biological identification and detection system
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs (a type of unit)
CAS	close air support
CB	chemical, biological
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological nuclear, and high-yield explosive
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
class I	class of supply including food, potable water, and rations
class III	bulk petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel
CMO	civil-military operations
co	company
COA	course of action
COLT	combat observation and lasing team (artillery observers equipped with laser designators)
consequence management	(DOD) those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. for domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the states to respond and the federal government to provide assistance as required. also called CM.(JP 1-02)

CONUS	continental United States
CS	1. combat support. 2. military abbreviation for riot control chemical agent, commonly called "tear gas."
CSS	combat service support
DA	Department of the Army
DLIC	detachment left in contact
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	direct support
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EP	electronic protection
EW	electronic warfare
FOX	designation given to an armored, wheeled (6x6) vehicle specially built to conduct nuclear and chemical reconnaissance
FRAGO	fragmentary order
GPS	global positioning system
GSR	ground surveillance radar
HC	abbreviation assigned to incendiary ordnance that produces dense gray-white smoke to cover tactical operations
hq	headquarters
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INFOSEC	information security
INFOSYS	information systems
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JTF	joint task force
LD	line of departure
LOA	limit of advance
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
MP	military police

MTP	mission training plan
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
OP	operational (as used in the AUTL and UJTL)
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAD	public affairs detachment
PERSEC	personnel security
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PL	phase line
PSYOP	psychological operations
Q36/Q37	counterfire radars used to track artillery and mortar rounds to determine the location of the system that fired them
RADCON	radiation control (a kind of unit)
REMBASS	remotely emplaced ground surveillance sensor system
RFA	restricted fire area
ROE	rules of engagement
SCBA	self-contained breathing apparatus
***sensitive site**	a geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military, or economic sensitivity to the united states
***sensitive site exploitation**	a related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site. these activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents
***sensitive site exploitation team**	a tailored organization responsible for entering a captured sensitive site to exploit its contents and neutralize or remove any threats posed by material found inside
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SME	subject matter expert
SN	strategic-national
SOP	standing operating procedures
ST	strategic-theater
STP	soldier training publication
TAML	theater asset medical lab
TEU	technical escort unit
TF	task force

tm	team
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (refers to the Army's heavy antitank missile system)
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UN	United Nations
UXO	unexploded ordnance
Viet Cong	a Communist-led army and guerrilla force in South Vietnam that fought its government and was supported by North Vietnam. Also members or supporters of this force
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WP	white phosphorous

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